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PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF STATE SECURITIES
REGULATION
JEROME E. WEINSTEIN*
I. A PREVIEW OF WESTERN AIR LINESt
A. STATEMENT
A troublesome problem in the field of state securities regulation is
the extent to which any particular "blue sky law" does regulate, and, in
fact, constitutionally can regulate a so-called "transaction effected
without entering the state."' This problem has become particularly
acute recently because of the decision of the California Superior
Court in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Stephenson, Comm's, a decision
which has far-reaching implications.'
The transactions to be analyzed are grouped into two categories.
The first category involves the problem of whether an offer or sale
effected in a state solely via the mails, or some interstate facility,
by a foreign issuer or broker, is covered by that state's securities
law; and, if so, whether that statute is constitutional.' The second
category involves this question: where a foreign corporation amends
its certificate of incorporation to change the rights of its shareholders,
and where all or nearly all of the steps necessary to accomplish this
change are effected beyond the borders of the state which seeks to
* A.B. 1956, Boston University; B.A. 1958, Cantab; LL B 1960, Harvard; Mem-
ber of the Massachusetts Bar; Legal Dep't, H. P. Hood & Son, Inc.
Part I appeared in substantially the same form in 10 Catholic U.L. Rev. 1
(1961) ; reprinted with permission.
Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 210 (1958); Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the
Blue Sky Laws, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1957); Cowett, Reorganizations, Consolidations,
Mergers and Related Corporate Events Under the Blue Sky Law, 13 Bus. Law. 418,
760 (1958); Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of
Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colurn. L. Rev. 1118 (1958); Jen-
nings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23
Law & Contemp. Prob. 193, 220 (1958); Sterling, Amendments to California Corpora-
tions laws, 1937: Readjusting Stock Structure, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 76, 86 (1937); Smith,
State 'Blue Sky' Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1135, 1141
(1936); Klagsbrunn, Regulation of Interstate Security Sales—A Recent Report, 1 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 88 (1933).
2 File No. LA-5822, Calif. Div. of Corps., Feb. 5, 1958, rev'd, Blue Sky L. Rep.
¶ 70,396 (Calif. Super. Ct., L.A. County, July 17, 1958), rev'd sub nom. Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, Comm'r, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
3 This problem has arisen in a few reported decisions: Traveller's Health Ass'n v.
Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263
(1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568
(1917); Bartlett v. Doherty, IC F. Supp. 465 (D.N.H. 1935), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 81 F.2d 920 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Doherty v. Knowlton, 298 U.S.
676 (1936).
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regulate, can that state demand that the corporation apply for and be
granted a permit before such a change is finally adopted on the ground
that there are resident shareholders to protect? In Western Air Lines
the change which the Delaware corporation sought to adopt was an
elimination of cumulative voting. In Western States Petroleum Co'
the Delaware corporation sought to effectuate a plan of merger. In
both cases, all or nearly ally of the steps necessary to effect the change
culminating in the charter amendment occurred outside California,
and in both cases the commissioner of corporations demanded a
permit. Thus, in both categories the inquiry will be directed first at
a construction of the statute to see whether in its terms these trans-
actions are covered; and, second at the constitutional problems in-
volved when a state statute is so interpreted to permit regulation.
The purpose of this article is not to examine the case of the sale
or exchange of securities with contacts in two or more states, and the
conflicts problem of what law governs the validity of that sale"
4 File No. LA-16541, Calif. Div. of Corps., Dec. 8, 1959. This case did not reach
the courts since the permit was issued.
5 There was proxy solicitation in California in Western Air Lines; the effect of
this on the power of California to regulate will be examined below.
6 Most states follow the rule that the law of the place of contract governs, or
the place where the last act necessary to make a binding contract occurs. Restatement,
Conflict of Laws §§ 311, 332 (1934) ; Brocalsa Chem. Co. v. Langsenkamp, 32 F.2d
725 (6th Cir. 1929); Lack v. Borsum, 44 F. Supp. 47 (W.D. La. 1942); Hohn v. Peters,
216 Cal. 406, 14 P.2d 519 (1932); Leven v. Legarra, 103 Cal. App. 2d 319, 229 P.2d
383 (1951); People ex rel. Brundage v. Hill Top Metals Mining Co., 300 III. 564, 133
NE. 303 (1921) ; Duke v. Olson, 240 III. App. 198 (1926); California Palisades Inc.
v. Manley, 214 Ind. 565, 16 N.E.2d 886 (1938); Somers v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 245
Mass. 286, 139 N.E. 837 (1923); Guyon v. Shulters, 223 Miss. 232, 78 So. 2d 114 (1955) ;
Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1955); McManus v. Fulton, 85 Mont. 170, 278
Pac. 126 (1929) ; Rhines v. Skinner Packing Co., 108 Neb. 105, 187 N.W. 874 (1922);
Russell v. Ruffcorn, 54 Nev. 162, 10 P.2d 632 (1932); Gillespie v. Blood, 81 Utah 306,
17 P.2d 822 (1932); United States Bond & Fin. Corp. v. National Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 758 (1932); Coral Gables Corp. v. Clay, 153 Va. 554, 149 S.E.
519 (1929) ; Estate of Suckow, 192 Wis. 124, 212 N.W. 280 (1927) ; Goodrich, The
Conflict of Laws H 107, 110 (3d ed. 1949); Fletcher, Private Corporations 6742
(repl. vol. 1954); 2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws § 332.57 (1935).
There is some authority for choosing the law of the place of performance to
govern: Persen v. National City Co., 129 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Motor
Products Mfg. Corp., 90 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1937); Los Angeles Fisheries, Inc. v. Crook,
47 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1931); Robbins v Pacific Eastern Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 241, 65 P.2d
42 (1937) ; Jones v. Re-Mine Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 832, 119 P.2d 219 (1941); Re-
statement, Conflict of Laws § 332, comment b (1934).
There is also some authority for fixing the law of the place of the offer as the
governing law: Intermountain Title Guar. Co. v. Egbert, 52 Idaho 402, 16 P.2d 390
(1932); Lewis v. Bricker, 235 Mich. 656, 209 N.W. 832 (1926); Streissguth v. Chase
Sec. Corp., 198 Minn. 17, 268 N.W. 638 (1936); or, the law having the most "contacts"
with the contract: Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Indus., Inc., 239 F.2d 716
(2d Cir. 1956); W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945);
Westlake, Private International Law § 212 (7th ed. 1925).
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Furthermore, it is not necessary to consider whether a state can
regulate where the vendor or offeror enters the state and carries on
negotiations leading to a sale either within that state or elsewhere;
this seems to be constitutionally permissible.' The real problem is
that situation where a foreign corporation never enters the regulating
state, and yet effects either an offer or a sale there, or some change
in the rights of resident shareholders.
This problem concerns the power to regulate transactions without
entering the state, and is to be distinguished from the problem of en-
forcement—topics which are often confused.' Although the recent
decisions on the question of enforcement by substituted process on the
non-resident indicate a broadening concept of state jurisdiction, 0
 it
is wise at the outset to separate the due process tests sustaining sub-
stituted service, and the constitutional tests sustaining a power to reg-
ulate. The problem of enforcement by extradition as well as by sub-
stituted service is beyond the scope of this article?'
7 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls
Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568
(1917); cf. Gillis v. Pan American Western Pet. Co., 3 Cal. 2d 249, 44 P.2d 311 (1935);
London, Paris & American Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 601 (9th Cir. 1902) ; Biddle
v. Smith, 148 Tenn. 489, 256 S.W. 453 (1923).
a Sec Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rd. State Corp.
Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), in which the majority confuses the two problems. The
dissenting opinion did attempt to distinguish them: "We are not dealing here with
the power of Virginia to regulate the transaction of insurance business with its
citizens, as was the case in Osborn v. Ozlin . . . and Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen. . . .
In the case at bar we are only concerned with how Virginia may enforce such power
as it has." Id. at 659.
9 The cases indicate a trend that jurisdiction will be sustained to enter a judg-
ment on substituted service in an action against a non-resident even in a case arising
out of an isolated transaction effected via the mails: McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1953). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where sub-
stituted service on a non-resident was not sustained in a case where the "contact"
with the serving state was both isolated and unconnected with the dispute. See also
Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n,
188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Schutt v. Commercial Travellers Mut. Acc. Ass'n,
229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1956); Florence Nightingale School of Nursing v. Superior Court,
168 Cal. App. 2d 74, 335 P.2d 240 (1959) ; Flynn v. Physicians Casualty Ass'n, 20 Conn.
Supp. 240, 131 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. 1957). But see Anschell v. Sackheim, 145 F. Supp.
447 (D.N.J. 1956); Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615
(N.D. Ill. 1959); Putnam v. Triangle Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
The latter two cases are libel cases holding that a foreign publishing corporation is not
"doing business" in a state for purposes of substituted service simply because its
periodicals are sold in the state.
10 The extradition clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, pro-
vides that "A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
383
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B. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are at least four clauses of the Constitution which are
relevant in determining whether a state can regulate a transaction
effected within the state, where the defendant issuer or broker, as the
case may be, has never entered the state." These clauses are the
contract clause, the commerce clause, the due process clause, and the
full faith and credit clause.
1. The Contract Clause. It has been held in the case of a com-
mon law sale within the regulating state (sale A) that the securities
law is not constitutional within the purview of the contract clause."
The transactions to be examined here also include a sale within the
state, and at least in the first category to be examined, a contract in
the common law sense of an offer, acceptance and consideration; but
effected in such a way that the issuer or dealer does not enter the
state (sale B). In an effort to discover on what constitutional grounds
regulation of sale B might be attacked, it is perhaps not enough to
say either that it is different from sale A or that sale B, and not sale A,
is within the protection of the contract clause. Where it is necessary
to distinguish between sales made in the state, any constitutional
having jurisdiction of the Crime." If the person were not in the state at the time the
crime was committed he would not he a fugitive from justice under the clause: Hyatt
v. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903) ; Ex parte Shoemaker, 25 Cal. App. 551, 144 Pac. 985
(1914); Ex parte Heath, 87 Mont. 370, 287 Pac. 636 (1930). This problem may not
prove fatal since nearly all of the states have passed the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act. For example, Ala. Code tit. 15, 44 48-75 (1958). Section 53 provides:
The governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the executive
authority of any other state, any person in this state charged on indictment
found in such other state with committing an act in this state intentionally
resulting in a crime in such other state, and the provisions of this article
not otherwise inconsistent shall apply in such cases notwithstanding that the
accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime,
and has not fled therefrom.
See Timbers and Pollack, Extradition from Canada to the U.S. for Securities Fraud:
Frustration of the National Policies of Both Countries, 16 Fed. B. J. 31 (1956).
For a general discussion of the enforcement problems arising out of Traveller's Health
Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d
263 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), see Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 482 (1951).
11 In Traveller's Health Assin v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 651 (1950), mention is made in the majority opinion of a con-
stitutional argument based on an infringement of the federal control of the mails.
However, since that argument was not included in appellant's brief on submission
of the case, the Court did not address itself to that point. It is suggested, however,
that the clause on the mails adds little, if anything, to an argument based on the
commerce clause. The argument based on the mails was specifically rejected by the
Supreme Court of Virginia: Traveller's Health Ass in v. Commonwealth of Virginia
ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949).
12 In re MacLean, 147 Kan. 678, 78 P.2d 855 (1938) ; Commissioner of Banks v.
Chase Sec. Corp., 298 Mass. 285, 10 N.E.2d 472 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 660
(1938); State v. Nordstrom, 169 Minn. 214, 210 N.W. 1001 (1926).
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argument must advance the reasons why sale B should be immune
from state regulation. One such reason is that the state seeking to
regulate does not have a sufficient "governmental interest" or contact
with the transaction; i.e., it belongs to Congress (commerce clause)
or to another state (full faith and credit clause) to regulate; or
whoever can regulate, state X can not (due process). The other
clauses are necessary to supply the added constitutional ballast to
weigh in the scales against the police power, to attempt a differenti-
ation between sale A and sale B, and to explain why the latter and
not the former may be constitutionally protected. Most of the cases
which involve prohibitions on the state for "reaching out" beyond its
jurisdiction in an area not competent for it to legislate, and which
contain references to the contract clause, also contain references to
full faith and credit and due process."
2. The Commerce Clause. The commerce clause is also of doubtful
assistance in developing a constitutional argument against regulation
of transactions without entering the state. Whenever a state is held
incompetent to apply its law to an interstate transaction on the ground
of the commerce clause, it is not because the law of another state is
applicable, but because the law of no state is applicable—"regu-
lation of inter-state commerce being committed by the Constitution
to the Federal Government!" 4
In considering whether a transaction without entering the state
is the type of transaction which can only be regulated by the federal
government, it should be noted that Congress in five out of the six
statutes administered by the SEC has made specific provisions pre-
serving the blue sky laws." Moreover, even before these specific pro-
visions were enacted, the Supreme Court in a series of cases decided
that the commerce clause did not impede a state from regulating
13 Bayard v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951); Holderness
v. Hamilton Fire Ins, Co., 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944). See also Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). For a detailed examination of the contract clause
see Hale, The Supreme Court and Contract Clause, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852
(1944).
14 Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?,
15 Minn. L. Rev. 161, 165 (1931).
13 Securities Act § 18, 48 Stat. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1958); Securities
Exchange Act § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1958); Public Utility
Holding Company Act § 21, 49 Stat. 834 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79u (1958); Trust In-
denture Act § 326, 53 Stat. 1177 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77zzz (1958); Investment Com-
pany Act § 50, 54 Stat. 846 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1958). The Interstate Com-
merce Act § 20a, 41 Stat. 494 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 20a (1958), gives the ICC exclusive
power to regulate the issuance of securities by any carrier subject to its jurisdiction.
Mr. Cowett states that this pre-emption in the latter act has not been followed, be-
cause some states for some unknown reason require registration of securities of carriers
subject to the ICC. Cowett, supra note 1, at 764.
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securities transactions within the state, even though in one case the
securities dealer merely directed offers into the state by means of
interstate facilities, and never himself entered the state."
Therefore, although the federal statutes do not in so many words
say that the states are left with the power to regulate the transaction
without entering the state, blue sky laws are preserved generally,
and there is at least one decision—although without reasoning on the
point—holding that state regulation of this transaction is not contrary
to the commerce clause." Moreover, even in the second category of
transactions effected by charter amendments, the competition would
appear to be between two or more state schemes of regulation, rather
than competition between a state and the federal government's Thus,
this article will examine in greater detail the implications of the due
process and the full faith and credit clauses as to both categories.
3. Due Process and Full Faith and Credit. The test which
appears to be applied when due process is argued in a case involving
legislative jurisdiction is as follows: does the forum have a sufficient
"governmental interest" to justify its action; or, as one distinguished
commentator has phrased it: "Does the state have a legitimate interest
in the application of its policy?"" This point of view has considerable
case law support. 2°
16 Merrick v. N. H. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). The foreign partnership
in this case was one of a number of complainants seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the Michigan blue sky law. The Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute
without expressly dealing with the special problem raised by the type of business in
which this partnership was engaged. Moreover, the decision from this point of view is
even less satisfactory since the Court merely said: "Answer to the contention that the
statute is an interference with inter-state commerce we leave to our opinion in [Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1916)]." Id. at 590.
11 See Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). But see two
unofficial opinions of the securities commissioners of Idaho and South Carolina who
believe that if this type of offer or sale is covered by any of the statutes administered
by the SEC, then their respective state statutes cannot be applied. Letter from R. U.
Spaulding, Commissioner of Finance, State of Idaho, to the author, Jan. 22, 1960;
letter from R. L. Kelly, Securities Commissioner, State of South Carolina, to the
author, March 16, 1960. Both letters are on file in the Harvard Law Library.
16 See Western Air Lines v. Stephenson, Comm'r, Blue Sky L. Rep. 5 70,396
(Calif. Super. Ct., L.A. County, July 17, 1958).
12 Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law : Governmental Interest and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 49 (1958). For other articles in general
accord with the conclusion stated in the text see: Reese and Kaufman, supra note 1,
at 1129; Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19
U. Chi. L. Rev. 339, 342 (1952); Hilpert and Cooley, The Federal Constitution and
the Choice of Law, 25 Wash. U.L.Q. 27, 50, 55 (1939).
20 Watson v. Employers Liab Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); National Ins. Co. v.
Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918);
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The more troublesome question today, however, is whether the
full faith and credit clause says any more than the due process clause.
There are, for example, a number of commentators who think that the
same test applies to both. 21
 They say that the full faith and credit
clause and the due process clause complement each other in choice of
law situations involving the statute law of sister states. Thus, if a
state with no "governmental interest" applies its own statute to a
transaction, it is a denial of due process; and, if at the same time they
refuse to apply the statute of a sister state which is based on a suffi-
cient "governmental interest," it is a denial of full faith and credit.'
Other writers have taken the position that the full faith and credit
clause requires the court to weigh the relevant national and state
interests and to choose the law of that state with the superior interest.'
Although a reading of the relevant decisions in this area does not
provide a clear answer to this problem, the majority of the cases can
Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916); New Lork Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149
(1914); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Sun Life Ins. Office Ltd. v.
Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959); Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F.
Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944). Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934), has been criticized in that it overlooked the "governmental interest" of Missis-
sippi, the place where the loss occurred. Currie, supra note 19, at 44-46. See also in
this connection Bayard v. Traders and Cen. Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951).
21 Currie, supra note 19, at 49; Currie, The Constitution and the Transitory Cause
of Action, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 36, 42 (1959); Reese, supra note 19, at 342; Moore and
Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 Va. L. Rev. 557, 609
(1943); Hilpert and Cooley, supra note 19, at 41-43. See Stumberg, Principles of Con-
flicts of Laws 67-68 (2d ed. 1951).
22 See note 21 supra. It is important to remember that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given . . . to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
State." U.S. Const. art. IV, {i 1. This has been interpreted to mean that full faith
and credit will be given to the statute-law of a sister state: Smithsonian Institution
v. S. John, 214 U.S. 19 (1909) ; 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1958). More-
over, there is a growing body of opinion which says that full faith and credit must
also be given to the decisional law of a sister-state: Currie, supra note 19, at 15-16;
cf. Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944). Similarly,
writers have felt that a state may deprive a party of due process by applying the
common law of any state having no interest in the matter: Hilpert and Cooley, supra
note 19, at 54-58; Currie, supra note 19, at 16; cf. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
These last two problems will not present any difficulties here, since the categories of
cases to be discussed will involve only statutory law, and it is settled that due process
will upset an improper application of the statutory law of the forum and full faith
and credit will upset a failure to apply the properly controlling statute of a sister-
state. See note 20 supra and note 24 infra.
23 Reese and Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1132; Comment, Full Faith and Credit
to Statutes, 45 Yale L.J. 339 (1935); Holt, Full Faith and Credit—A Suggested Ap-
proach to the Problem of Recognition of Foreign Corporations, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 453,
478 (1941); see Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 433, 437-38 (1950); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—the Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1945).
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be explained on the first tee' In one area, in particular, although
the courts give "lip service" to the "weighing of interests" test, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the courts will allow the forum to
apply its own law, simply on a showing that the forum has a sufficient
interest in the transaction in question; this is in the area of workmen's
compensation.25
There are two other areas in which the full faith and credit
clause has been applied. Neither of these is clearly explicable on the
first test; that is, in both areas it would appear that the courts are
first considering the legitimate concern of the forum and the sister
state, as well as a national concern for uniformity; second, weighing
them, and last, choosing the law representing the superior interest. In
the first line of cases, it has been held that full faith and credit
demands that the liability of a shareholder of a corporation for
corporate debts, and the manner in which it may be enforced, are
governed solely by the statutes of the state of incorporation. Such
liability cannot be increased, nor a different remedy given, by the
statutes of any other state in which the corporation may do business?'
Unfortunately, the authority of these cases has been lessened some-
24 Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Klaxon v. Stentor Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941); John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Metro-
politan Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 112 (1934);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leibing,
259 U.S. 209 (1922); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386 (1910); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900).
25 In Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), a New Hampshire
court was compelled to give full faith and credit to a Vermont workmen's compensation
act, although the injury was caused in New Hampshire. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), it was held where the contract of employ-
ment was entered into in California, the injury occurring in Alaska, notwithstanding
that the contract recited that the employee was to be bound by the Alaska com-
pensation statute, that due process and full faith and credit were not violated by an
application of California law. The Court (Id. at 547-48), however, applied a "weigh-
ing" test. Bradford was distinguished in Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Arc. Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493 (1938), where it was held that California did not have to give full faith
and credit to a Massachusetts compensation statute where the injury occurred in
California. In Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), it was similarly held that the
state where the worker was injured could award him damages although the com-
pensation act of the state where the contract of employment was made and the
parties resided purported to give an exclusive remedy. See Watson v. Employers Liab.
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) ; Mr. Currie in an examination of these cases, supra note 19,
at 26-27, distinguishes Bradford from the subsequent cases by saying that the former
case was one of wrongful death and the latter were cases of personal injury, and he
argues that in Bradford New Hampshire had no interest in the application of its
wrongful death statute. This effects a harmonization of this case with the first test,
but it is admitted to be a "latter-day rationalization."
26 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243
(1912); Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner, 163 Fed. 605 (S.D. Tex. 1908). See
Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
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what by a series of contrary decisions permitting application of share-
holder liability statutes of states other than that of incorporation."
The second line of cases has consistently held that the rights of
members of a fraternal and beneficiary society must be determined by
the law of the state of the society's incorporation.' These cases have
been heavily criticized by those advocates of the first test;" and,
it is true both that the most recent decision embodying the rule for
beneficiary societies was a 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court,' and
that the rule was successfully avoided by a decision in the sixth
circuit.' However, Wolfe, and the cases which it followed, are
significant for the purposes of this study for this reason: they demon-
strate that the Supreme Court, when faced with the problem of whether
a state should be compelled to give full faith and credit to the statutes
of another state, will, in certain types of transactions, consider the
national concern for the application of a uniform law, and will, when
the occasion calls for it, direct all states to apply that uniform law.
C. OFFERS AND SALES EFFECTED IN A STATE VIA THE MAILS
1. The Case Law. In Merrick v. Halsey & Co." the question
presented was the validity of the Michigan blue sky law. The persons
bringing the suit to enjoin the enforcement of the statute consisted
27 Thomas v. Mathiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144
(1901). See Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 158 Cal. 275, 110 Pac. 942 (1910). In
Thomas v. Matthiessen, supra at 235, the Court did not apply the rule that the
liability of a stockholder is to be determined solely by the charter and laws of the
incorporating state. The Court said that since the corporation was authorized to do
business in California, the shareholder must be deemed to have given his consent to
its doing business there. "He knew that California had laws and he took his risk
of what they might be, when ... he gave his assent to doing business there." Coleman,
supra note 23, at 478, attempts to reconcile the cases on a "weighing of interests"
approach:
the cases are . . . consistent with the theory that a state other than that
of incorporation is under a duty to give full faith and credit to the immunity
from personal liability granted a shareholder by the statute of the state of
incorporation, unless some interest is shown in imposing personal liability that
is superior to the interest of the state of incorporation in granting immunity
from such liability.
28 Order of United Commercial Travellers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947);
SOvereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Modern Woodman v. Mixer, 267 U.S.
544 (1925); Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
29 Currie, supra note 19, at 49, 52, 76. Mr. Currie's main objection to an interest
weighing approach is that it turns the courts into miniature legislatures. The role of
the courts, he believes, should be confined to an inquiry into whether the state seeking
to apply its law, has a "legitimate interest in the application of its policy." Note, Full
Faith and Credit: Preferential Treatment of Fraternal Insurers, 57 Yale L.J. 139, 141
(1947).
30 Order of United Commercial Travellers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
al Order of United Commercial Travellers v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1955).
32 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
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of a considerable number of corporations, partnerships and individuals.
These complainants alleged that the statute was unconstitutional as
contrary to due process and to the commerce and cruel and unusual
punishment clauses; and that the statute consisted of an unconsti-
tutional delegation of power to the Michigan Securities Commission."
Among those contesting was Remick, Hodges Company, a partnership.
Remick and Hodges were both residents of New York, and March, a
third partner, was a resident of New Jersey Their office was in New
York City, and they were engaged in the business of buying and selling
stock, bonds and other securities. They carried on business in New
York and elsewhere through agents and by means of the mails. The
partners had no place of business in Michigan and were not at
the time of this suit sending agents into the state. However, they
had been offering and were offering securities for sale to customers
in the state of Michigan by mail, telegraph or telephone." The Court
held (Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting) that the Michigan blue
sky law was a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and was
not unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment, the commerce
clause, or as an unconstitutional delegation of power."
No consideration was given to the special problem raised by the
New York partnership. The case, therefore, amounts to a blanket
validation of the Michigan blue sky law even as applied to offers
effected in a state solely by use of the mails or other interstate facil-
ities. Although the Court did not give any special attention to this
transaction, it was believed by a number of practitioners at that
time, that the Court definitely meant what it was saying. For example,
the opinion of counsel, referred to above, 38 states:
Our conclusion on this point, therefore, is that if the
Blue Sky Laws were constitutional in their entirety and as
they seem to be construed by the State officials, the offering
of securities by mail or telegraph, or even by telephone, from
outside the State would constitute a violation of the law
and be indictable and punishable as such in the State."
as Id. at 570-71.
34 Id. at 572-73. See opinion delivered to the Investment Bankers Association of
America, by its counsel, Reed & McCook of New York, in Elliott, The Annotated Blue
Sky Laws of the United States 34-44 (1919), and in Reed & Washburn, Blue Sky
Laivs, Analysis and Text 255a-67a (1921).
36 Id. at 589-90. See note 16 supra on the special problem raised by the com-
merce clause.
36 See note 34 supra.
37 Elliott, op. cit. supra note 34, at 38.
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The opinion also refers to the problem of advertisements:
The conclusion above stated necessarily applies to ad-
vertisements in papers published in the Blue Sky State,
the papers being in legal effect a medium through which the
offering is made to the investor. It would seem also to apply
though with manifest difficulties in its application, to ad-
vertisements in papers or magazines published in other States
and circulating in the Blue Sky States. We say with manifest
difficulties in its application, because in a crimnal prosecution
it would, we hope, be impossible to convict a dealer for an
advertisement in a Springfield, Illinois, paper a few copies
of which without his knowledge, in intent, found their way
into Iowa. On the other hand, an advertisement in a Chicago
paper made with knowledge of its wide circulation in Michi-
gan . . . would seem to constitute an intended offering
of the security in those states, as would also an advertise-
ment in a national magazine known to circulate in all or
most of the states."
Wrigley Pharmaceutical Co. v. Cameron" was decided nine years
later. The plaintiff in that case was a Delaware corporation with an
office in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The president of the corporation
was a citizen of Pennsylvania and an inhabitant of Philadelphia. The
defendants were the conlmissioner of banking and the attorney gen-
eral of Pennsylvania. Wrigley had been engaged in the sale of tooth
paste and treasury stock to inhabitants of Pennsylvania by use of
circulars sent through the mails from Atlantic City to the Pennsyl-
Ibid.
39 16 F.2d 290 (M.D. Pa. 1926); Klagsbrunn, Regulation of Interstate Security
Saks—A Recent Report, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 88, 89 (1933). See also Duke v. Olson,
240 III. App. 198 (1926). This was a suit brought to enforce double liability of a
stockholder of a bank under a Washington statute. The defendant contended, inter alia,
that the stock was sold to him in violation of the blue sky law of Illinois. The facts
were that one J saw a circular in his office at Chicago, soliciting sales of securities,
inquiries to be directed to Tacoma, Washington. J induced the defendant to buy,
defendant agreed, and J wired the bank for fifteen shares (five for himself and ten for
defendant). The bank acknowledged receipt and sent subscription blanks to J. J was
not an agent of the bank. The court merely said, as to this point, "Under similar
circumstances, it was held that there was no violation of the Blue Sky Law. People
v. Hill Top Metals Min. Co., 300 III. 564." Id. at 206. An examination of People
ex rel. Brundage v. Hill Top Metal Mining Co., 300 III. 564, 133 N.E. 303 (1921),
indicates that the court in Duke treated this transaction as a sale made in Washington;
and, on the majority view that the validity of a contract is determined by the law
of the place of contracting, Illinois law was inapplicable; it was merely the place
where the sale was solicited. The court is not saying, however, that an offer to sell
securities directed into Illinois would not be a violation of the statute, even though
via the mails.
391
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
vania residents. When the commissioner of banking issued a sub-
poena to the president and vice-president, requiring their presence for
an examination pursuant to the Pennsylvania securities law, the
officers refused to appear, and instead filed a bill to restrain the de-
fendants from prosecuting any civil or criminal action under the
statute because it was in violation of the commerce clause of the
Constitution.4° The court dismissed the action as premature, for the
reason that it was impossible to determine that it was the intention of
the authorities of Pennsylvania to undertake any direct interference
with interstate commerce." However, the court did express itself on
how it would probably treat the case, if it were not premature. Citing
Merrick, it said that ". . . it is clear that the Pennsylvania Securities
Act cannot be attacked on the ground that it is an unlawful inter-
ference with interstate commerce?'
This case is vulnerable for three reasons: (1) the statement of
the court as to the constitutionality of the statute amounts only to_
a dictum; (2) it is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the
mail order business was carried on solely via the mails (the president
and vice-president were both citizens of Pennsylvania); (3) the
court, as in Merrick, did not address itself to the specific problem
of offers effected in the state solely via the mails. However, the impli-
cation of the decision is that the statute covered this type of trans-
action (assuming it was carried on solely via the mails), and that
there was no constitutional objection.
Then in Bartlett v. Doherty," the court dealt separately with two
transactions. In the first transaction, the plaintiffs had given orders
in New Hampshire for the purchase of stock from the defendant,
having been solicited by an agent of the defendant who was physi-
cally in the state. In the second transaction one of the plaintiffs,
Bartlett, called the defendant's Boston office by telephone for infor-
mation conncerning some stock previously purchased. The call was
referred to the New Hampshire agent who at that time was present
in the Boston office. The agent urged Bartlett to buy more stock.
The plaintiff agreed and mailed a check to the Boston office. The
stock was delivered and accepted by the plaintiff in New Hampshire."
The action arose when the plaintiffs sought to recover money paid for
the stocks which they alleged were sold in violation of the New Hamp-
49 16 F.2d at 291.
41 Id. at 296.
42 Ibid.
43 10 F. Supp. 465 (D. N.H. 1935), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 81 F.2d 920
(1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Doherty v. Knowlton, 298 U.S. 676 (1936).
44 81 F.2d at 921-22.
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shire blue sky law. That law provided: "No salesman or agent shall
in this state, in behalf of any dealer, sell, offer for sale or invite offers
for or inquiries about securities unless registered. . . . "45 (Emphasis
added.) It was alleged that the New Hampshire agent was not reg-
istered. The district court decided in favor of the plaintiffs in each
case and the defendants appealed.
As to the first transaction the court affirmed the decision of the
district court. The court said that: "If an unregistered salesman or
agent sold or took orders for stock in violation of such statutes and
his illegal acts cannot be ratified by his principal, a purchaser, on
offering to return his stock and any benefit received therefrom, is
entitled to recover the purchase price?" 4a However, the court reversed
the district court and held that the second transaction was not covered
by the securities act. The court said:
No act of Parent, either of solicitation or offer of sale,
took place in New Hampshire. No contract of sale, even if
Parent was authorized to make a contract of sale, was entered
into by him while in New Hampshire. He violated no pro-
vision of the New Hampshire law by soliciting a sale in
Massachusetts, where he was duly registered and authorized
to solicit a sale of securities as a representative of the de-
fendant, Doherty."
The decision seems to indicate that to be a violation of the
statute there must be an offer or sale in New Hampshire. There was an
offer in this case, but that offer, the court held, was made in Massachu-
setts, not in New Hampshire. This interpretation of the law runs
counter to the view that a proposal is not an "offer" until it is re-
ceived." The view that the proposal is not an offer until receipt points
to the place of receipt as the place where the offer is "made."" But
here we are left with a rather strict interpretation of the statute;
that is, an offer can only be made in New Hampshire when the offeror
is physically present in that state. The court said that "no contract
of sale ... was entered into by (the agent) while in New Hampshire.""
45 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421:18 (1955), which makes the provision as stated
in the text. It was admitted that the defendant was registered as a dealer under the
statute. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421:7 (1955).
46 81 F.2d at 927.
" Id. at 928.
45 Restatement, Contracts § 23 (1932).
45 The Uniform Securities Act § 414(c) solves the problem by saying that an
offer is "made in this state" either if it "originates from this state" or if it "is directed
by the offeror to this state."
55 81 F.2d at 928.
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(Emphasis added.) Thus, the statutory phrase "in this state," not
only modifies ". . . sell, offer for sale . . ." but also ". . . sales-
man or agent . . ." so that in order to violate the New Hampshire
statute a salesman must actually enter the state and carry on his
negotiations there.'
It must be remembered that this is a federal court decision con-
struing the New Hampshire statute. Even if New Hampshire still
places this restrictive interpretation on her blue sky law—binding only
those defendants who make sales or offers when physically present
in the state—this does not mean that a broader interpretation would
be unconstitutional. There is no indication in the case that the court
was interpreting the statute so as to make it constitutional.
Before turning to the leading case on this subject, reference might
be made to Hardy v. Musicraft Records, Inc." In that case, the plain-
tiff, at his Los Angeles residence, received a letter forwarded from
New York from the predecessor of the defendant corporation. The
letter enclosed a purchase commitment letter for the plaintiff's use
in confirming an agreement to buy shares of the predecessor corpo-
ration. The plaintiff signed the purchase commitment letter and sent
it by mail from Los Angeles to the corporation in New York. Cer-
tificates representing 5,000 shares in the corporation were forwarded
from New York to the California Bank in Los Angeles and were
eventually delivered to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff discovered
that no permit had been procured by the corporation for the sale
of its shares, this action was brought to recover the purchase price. 53
The court held that since the contract was made in California by
mailing the purchase commitment letter there, the validity of that
contract was governed by California law. The California statute, as
it then provided, stated that: "Every security issued by any company
without a permit of the commissioner authorizing the same then in
51 Two points should be kept in mind: first, whether the words "in this state"
appear in the statute, or not, any offer or sale which does not occur within the state
cannot be constitutionally regulated by a statute of that state; at least in this sense
a statute can have no extra-territorial effect. See, e.g., People v. J. O. Beckman lit Co.,
347 IL 92, 97, 179 N.E. 435, 437 (1932). This proposition will be examined more
fully in connection with the second category of transactions to be analyzed. It is only
necessary here to point out that while in Merrick it was both assumed that the offers
via the mails occurred within the state and that the statute covered those offers, and
held that the statute was constitutional, in Doherty it was held that the offer did not
occur within the state, and hence, was not covered by the statute. Second, most of
the blue sky laws contain the phrase "in this state," but, as will be seen, the majority
of blue sky administrators do not imply the same physical presence qualification into
their provisions as did the Doherty court into the New Hampshire statute.
52 93 Cal. App. 2d 698, 209 P.2d 839 (1949).
53 Id. at 700, 209 P.2d at 840.
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effect, shall be void."" The court then said that since the sale was
made in violation of the statute the transaction was void and the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover their money." This is another de-
cision following Merrick but without a reasoned opinion."
The discussion of the case law on this subject ends with Trav-
eller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n." The following is a statement of facts:"
The appellant Traveller's Health Association was incor-
porated in Nebraska as a nonprofit membership association
in 1904. Since that time its only office has been located
in Omaha, from which it has conducted a mail-order health
insurance business. New members pay an initiation fee and
obligate themselves to pay periodic assessments at the Omaha
office. The funds so solicited are used for operating expenses
and sick benefits to members. The Association has no paid
agents; its new members are usually obtained through the
unpaid activities of those already members, who are en-
couraged to recommend the Association to friends and
submit their names to the home office. The appellant Pratt
54 Cal. Corp. Code 26100 now provides: "Every security of its own issue sold or
issued by any company without a permit is void." In spite of the language which is
found in the cases that stock issued in violation of the securities act is "void," it is
well settled that such securities are merely voidable at the behest of innocent purchasers
or subsequent assignees: Eberhard v. Pacific Northwest Loan & Mortgage Corp., 215
Cal. 226, 9 P.2d 302 (1932); Robbins v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 241, 65 P.2d
42 (1937); Western Oil & Ref. Co. v. Venago Oil Corp., 218 Cal. 733, 24 P.2d 971
(1933); Braunstein v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 216 Cal, 780, 17 P.2d 104 (1932);
Dahlquist, 'Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities
Act: II, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 344, 352-53 (1946).
55 Hardy v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 2d 698, 703, 209 P.2d 839, 842
(1949).
50 Mention may be made of a point which is often overlooked in discussing B. C.
Turf & Country Club, Ltd. v. Daugherty, 94 Cal. App. 2d 320, 210 P.2d 760 (1949),
a proceeding to compel the commissioner of corporations to rescind an order directing
petitioner, a Canadian corporation, to cease and desist from further sale of stock within
the state. The decisive question was whether there was a solicitation of a sale in
violation of the California statute. The court laid heavy stress on certain incidents
which in their view did not amount to "solicitation." However, they ignored an
incident which occurred after the plan to sell stock had been put into operation: "A
Mr. Gilmore, a client of Fraser's [the principal promoter] telephoned Fraser [who was
in Canada] from San Francisco and asked about the deal, and was told by Fraser
about the procedure to be followed." Id. at 325, 210 P.2d at 763. Was the court treating
this as de minimus, or is something being said about the application of the California
statute?
67 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949) [Comment, 59 Yale L.J. 360 (1950); Note,
17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 382 (1950)], afi'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Notes, 39 Calif. L. Rev.
152 (1951), 64 Harv. L. Rev. 482 (1951); Comment, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 881 (1951);
Recent Case, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245 (1950).
58 339 U.S. at 645-46.
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in Omaha mails solicitations to these prospects. He encloses
blank applications which, if signed and returned to the home
office with the required fee, usually result in election of
applicants as members. Certificates are then mailed, subject
to return within 10 days if not satisfactory. Traveller's has
solicited Virginia members in this manner since 1904, and
has caused many sick benefit claims to be investigated. When
these proceedings were instituted it had approximately 800
Virginia members.
The Virginia Corporation Commission, determining that the activities
of Traveller's violated the state blue sky law—requiring those selling
or offering securities to obtain a permit—instituted cease and desist
proceedings against the insurance company and its treasurer."
The Virginia court first asked whether "the activities of the appel-
lants in the Commonwealth of Virginia have been such as to subject
them to the State's regulatory power."" The court stressed the fol-
lowing activities taking place in Virginia: solicitation of new members
by old members, investigations, remittances in payment of benefit
claims being received and accepted in the Commonwealth, and the
sales actually being made there. If the court had continued along this
line of inquiry, a more satisfactory reasoning for the result might
have been obtained. Unfortunately, the court mixed the question of
the power to regulate with the power to enforce, and it did not care-
fully segregate its authorities under one or the other of the two
issues"' However, despite this, the court did make a clear statement
of its holding:
We hold, in view of the authorities referred to, that the
evidence in possession of the State Corporation Commission
constituted good cause to conclude that the appellants had
been engaged in selling securities in Virginia through the
United States mail without complying with, and in violation
of, the provisions of the applicable laws of the state."
It is assumed that the offers or solicitations made by the association
59 Id. at 646.
60 188 Va. at 885, 51 S.E.2d at 265.
01 For example, the court, in seeking to refute appellant's argument that the
"association is not engaged in business activities in Virginia such as to bring them
within the jurisdiction of the courts of this state," and to distinguish Minnesota Com-
mercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923) (a case dealing with whether an
association was doing business in Montana for purposes of substituted service), cited a
service of process case, and then cited Merrkk, for the proposition that a state may
regulate sales of securities through the mails. Id. at 888-89, 51 S.E.2d at 267-68.
62 Id. at 892, 51 S.E.2d at 269.
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occurred within Virginia (contrary to the Doherty approach). The
court held that the sales occurred within Virginia, and apparently
that these acts within Virginia constituted violations of the blue sky
law.
The opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by Mr. Justice
Black, is unsatisfactory for the same reason noted above with respect
to the Virginia decision. The Court said that the basic contention
‘`. . . is that all their activities take place in Nebraska and that
consequently Virginia has no power to reach them in cease and
desist proceedings to enforce any part of its regulatory law!'" (Em-
phasis added.) However, the Court went on to speak of what con-
stitutes "doing business" justifying regulation, and cited Osborn v.
Oslin," and Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen," distinguishing Minnesota
Ass'n v. Henn," for the proposition that ". . . a state's power to
regulate need not be determined by a 'conceptualistic discussion of
theories of the place of contracting or of performance.' f 8' Yet, at
the same time the Court cites the landmark, substituted service case
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington," and lumping all these cases
together the Court concludes that ". . . the contacts and ties of
appellants with Virginia residents, together with that state's interest
in faithful observance of the certificate obligations, justify subjecting
appellants to cease and desist proceedings under § 6."" (Emphasis
added.) Further, the Court says: "We hold that Virginia's subjection
of this Association to the jurisdiction of that State's Corporation Com-
mission in a § 6 proceeding is consistent with 'fair play and substantial
63 339 U.S. at 646-47.
64 310 U.S. 53 (1940), where the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute which
provided that as to casualty and surety risks in Virginia, insured against by corporations
authorized to do business in that state, the insurance shall be through regularly con-
stituted and registered resident agents or agencies of such companies.
65 318 U.S. 313 (1943). The question was whether a reciprocal insurance association
which insured against fire and related risks might be constitutionally made subject to
a New York registration law. Except for the possibility that agents might be used to
investigate risks in New York, the business of the company was carried on through
the mails. The Court held that the statute was valid and not unconstituional under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This case is distinguishable from Traveller's on the ground
that, among other things, the insurance covered property situated in New York, and
the Court said that, "the states have long had great authority over property within
their borders." 318 U.S. at 318. On the other hand, this is a case involving regulation
and not enforcement, and it does indicate how far the courts are willing to go in
permitting the states to regulate business carried on via the mails.
Go 261 U.S. 140. See note 61 supra.
67 339 U.S. at 648.
68 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
63 339 U.S. at 648.
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justice,' and is not offensive to the Due Process Clause!'" (Emphasis
added.)
The opinion indicates that these solicitations and sales occurred
within Virginia. It is assumed that the Virginia blue sky law, as
construed, covers these transactions. Further, it is assumed—in view
of the fact that the opinion stresses the power to enforce to such
an extent—that Virginia constitutionally (presumably under the due
process clause) has the power to regulate these transactions.. The
thrust of the opinion seems directed at disposing of the constitutional
objections to the ability to enforce such power as Virginia is assumed
to have.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate concurring opinion, said that:
"The requirements of due process do not, in my opinion, preclude the
extension of Virginia's regulatory scheme to appellant."n Further-
more, he disposed of the objection based on the case where a policy-
holder seeks to sue the foreign company in Virginia: "His ability to
sue is not necessarily the measure of Virginia's power to regulate."'"
He said that: "Whether such solicitation is isolated or continuous,
it is activity which Virginia can regulate."" Hence, Mr. Justice
Douglas held that it was not a violation of due process for Virginia
to regulate sales and offers made within the state via the mails.
Mr. Justice Minton, joined by Mr. Justice Jackson, dissented
on the ground that the appeal was premature." He said: "I would
answer the question of due process when Virginia has attempted to
apply its process to appellants in a proceeding that has consequence
of a nature which entitles a person to the protection of the Due
Process Clause."" However, he voiced an opinion as to the matter of
substituted service, and said that for such purpose, he would not hold
that appellants were "present" in Virginia. He made it clear, however,
that he was discussing the power to enforce and not the power to regu-
late." Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, agreed with
the Court in reaching the merits, and on the merits joined the dissent."
The case is not satisfactory for a number of reasons: (1) as has
70 Id. at 649.
77 Id. at 652.
72 Id. at 653. This distinction was also drawn in the Virginia court, where an
attempt was made to distinguish the Bean case, which involved a "pecuniary civil
judgment," and Traveller's, which was an inquiry "quasi-criminal in its approach." 188
Va. at 889, 51 S.E.2d at 267.
73 339 U.S. at 654.
74 Id. at 655.
76 Id. at 657.
76 See note 8 supra.
77 339 U.S. at 659.
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been noted throughout the discussion of the case, the problem of reg-
ulation and enforcement are lumped together; (2) possibly the decision
only represents that line of cases recognizing the state's special interest
in regulating the insurance business; 78
 (3) there may be some factual
distinctions, such as the fact that the association relied on the activities
of old members to solicit new members or the fact that investigations
might be made in Virginia by the company. The Supreme Court
opinion, nevertheless, is strong authority for the proposition that when
an individual or corporation does a substantial amount of business in
the state, then that state has the power at least under the due process
clause to regulate offers and sales made within the state, effected by
the use of interstate facilities.
2. Administrative Opinions. A number of attorney general opin-
ions have been written on the issue of whether the particular blue sky
law in question was broad enough to cover an offer or sale effected in
the state solely by use of the mails. Those opinions vary, and many
of them probably do not represent current thinking among the present
securities commissioners and administrators. 79 Perhaps a more real-
istic indication of how blue sky law administrators construe their
statutes was obtained by a private survey conducted by the author.
The following questionnaire was sent to forty-eight administrators: 8°
A. Do you believe that your Blue Sky Law is broad enough to
cover an offer or sale (or both) of securities in your state,
78 "In Osbom v. Ozlin . . . we recognized that a state has a legitimate interest in
all insurance policies protecting its residents against risks, an interest which the state
can protect even though the 'state action may have repercussions beyond state
lines. . " Id. at 647.
79 In Ops. Ohio Att'y Gen. 1423 (1935), it was thought that newspapers published
out of state containing advertisements of securities did not violate the statute, and in
Ops. Ore. Att'y Gen. 688 (1940), it was said that where Oregon residents address inquiries
about stocks to a New York corporation and where negotiations are carried on through
the mails culminating in a sale in New York, the New York corporation is not violating
the Oregon act. In Ops. Conn. Att'y Gen. 350 (1932), the writer believed that a broker
located out of state, offering or selling securities to persons located within the state,
solely via the mails was subject to the securities act. The New Mexico Attorney
General, Ops. N.M. Att'y Gen. 38 (1933), although believing that sales via the mails
within the state were "technical" violations of the statute, did not believe that the state
could exercise effective control over these transactions. An earlier opinion in Ops. Mich.
Att'y Gen. 621 (1955), was overruled in a later opinion in Ops. Mich. Att'y Gen. 465
(1957), where it was held that non-resident dealers or brokers might not legally solicit
persons in Michigan by mails without being licensed as a securities dealer under the
Michigan blue sky law. A position similar to that of the Michigan Attorney General
was taken in 23 Ops. Md. Att'y Gen. 138 (1938), and in 17 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 217
(1951).
89 Delaware and Nevada, which have no blue sky laws, excepted. All correspondence
and other data relating to this survey are on file in Harvard Law Library.
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solely via the mails or some interstate facility, by a person
in another state?
B. This question covers not only the case of the individual con-
tract, but also the situation involving advertisements from
out-of-state newspapers, radio and television stations and the
like. Whatever your answer, it would be helpful if the section
or sections upon which you rely were cited.
Replies were received from forty-two states. Five states to date have
solved the problem by adopting Section 414 of the Uniform Se-
curities Act." Twenty-six state administrators answered "yes" to
the entire question, and of those twenty-six, sixteen referred to
specific sections of their statutes." Four administrators believe that
the answer to part "A" is "yes," but that their respective statutes do
not cover the case of out-of-state newspapers, radio and the like
Again, of those four, three referred to specific sections of their
statutes." Seven administrators answered "no" to the entire question,
and four of the answers pointed to particular sections of their codes 84
The Iowa administrator believed that although the act seemed broad
enough to cover interstate solicitations and sales, there was consid-
erable doubt about the ability to enforce such violations.' As the
North Dakota statute relating to securities registration uses the words
"offer to sell,"" and the dealer section reads, "No dealer or salesman
81 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 35-6-34 (Supp. 1959); Ark: Stat. Ann. § 67-1260
(Supp. 1961); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49-3-4 (Supp. 1961); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §§ 2(c),
2(f), 2(5)(2), 413 (Supp. 1961); S.C. Acts 1961, Blue Sky L. Rep. ¶ 43,226.
82 Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25009, 25500 (as amended, Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1574, § 1);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125-1-3(2) (Supp. 1960) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 517.02(3) (Supp.
1961); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.10 (Smith-Hurd 1960); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§* 25-830, 25 -831(c) (1960) [since repealed as the Uniform Securities Act was adopted
(effective July, 1961), Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 25-854 to 876]; Ran. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1254,
17-1255, 17-1265 (Supp. 1961); La. Rev. Stat. § 51:701(3) (1950); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 110A, § 5 (1958); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 80.01(3), 80.18 (Supp. 1959); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 81-304 (1958); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49:1-4 (1955) [since repealed as the
Uniform Securities Act was adopted (effective January, 1961), N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 49-3-4 (Supp. 1961)]; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-G; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 32(b)
(Supp. 1961) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-1602(F) (Supp. 1961); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 21.20.005(9) (Supp. 1960) [amended, and now appears in § 21.20.005(10) (Supp.
1961)] ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-103 (1957); Ala., Ga., Md., Miss., Mo., N.M., Ore., RI.,
Tex., Wis.
83 Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 199-6, 199-11, 199-16, 199-17, 199-20 (1955); Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-4(3) (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 4202, 4205, 4213, 4224 (1958); Ohio.
84 Idaho Code 4$ 26-1801, 26-1815 (1947); Rev. Stat. Me. Ann. ch. 59, § 228
(1959); W. Va. Code § 3273(12) (1955); Ariz., Conn., S.D., S.C.
85 Letter from C. L. Hughes, Securities Commissioner, to the author, March 21,
1960.




shall offer for sale or sell any securities .. . "87
 the North Dakota
blue sky administrator would answer "yes" to both parts of the
question, but only as to out-of-state newspapers having a "substantial
circulation" in the state, and television offers."
The results, then, suggest that a large majority of the adminis-
trators are in favor of a construction of their statutes which would
first, indicate that offers directed into the regulating state are made
in that state," and second, that the offers and sales so made in the
state are covered by their blue sky laws.
D. CoNcLusiox
There are a number of analogies which can be and have been drawn
in support of the state's power to regulate offers and sales of se-
curities." Perhaps, though, the problem is not as troublesome as it
once was. In the first place, there is the problem of where the offer
was made. All but one of the cases in this area have assumed that
where the offer is made via the mails or the telephone, it was made in
the state where it was received. It is submitted that Doherty may be
distinguished in future cases, possibly on the ground that it was the
customer, and not the broker, who took the initiative in that case.
Second, while nearly no state blue sky law expressly so provides (with
the exception of those states which have adopted Section 414 of
the Uniform Securities Act), the cases appear to either assume,"
or hold," that such offers or sales made within the state come within
87 N.D. Rev. Code § 10.0410 (Supp. 1957), as amended, N.D. Laws 1961, H.B.
921, § 9.
88 Letter from C. L. Hughes to the author, March 21, 1960.
99 Both the Michigan and the Texas administrators expressed agreement with this
proposition. Letter from C. Hayes, Assistant Commissioner, to the author, March 23,
1960, and Letter from W. King, Securities Commissioner, to the author, Jan. 28, 1960.
oa Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 215-21 (1958). For example, the authors point
to the criminal law analogies: it is generally held, assuming that the facts otherwise
disclose an offense committed within the jurisdiction, that the court is not deprived of
jurisdiction by mere absence of the defendant from the state at the time the offense was
committed: Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Lamar v. United States, 240
U.S. 60 (1916); Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); In re Palliser, 136 U.S.
257 (1890); United States v. Steinberg, 62 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 729 (1933); Ex parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 108 (1866); State v. Tickle, 238 N.C. 206,
77 S.E.2d 632 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 938 (1954). See also Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws § 43F(1)(e), comment at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). In the law
of torts, the conflicts principle is that the court must look to the law of the state where
the last event necessary for liability takes place: Aetna Freight Lines v. R. C. Tway
Co., 298 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1956); Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 377-79 (1934).
97 Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917);
Wrigley Pharmaceutical Co. v. Cameron, 16 F.2d 290 (M.D. Pa. 1926); Hardy v.
Musicraft Records, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 2d 698, 209 P.2d 839 (1949).
92 Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949).
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the purview of that state's securities law. Third, while none of the
cases above raised the point, it seems clear that the offering and selling
of stock by a foreign corporation within a state does not come under
the so-called "internal affairs" rule," a rule which says that a state
has no "visitorial" powers over foreign corporations and that its courts
will not interfere in their internal affairs and management."
Last is the constitutional issue. In spite of the uncertainties which
might still exist on this question, it is submitted that today there are
no constitutional objections where a state seeks to regulate interstate
solicitations and sales, made within its boundaries. If a straight
"governmental interest" test is adopted, that test appears to be satisfied.
It is well settled that a state has a sufficient concern to protect its
citizenry from "speculative schemes which have no more basis than
so many feet of 'blue sky'" or "to stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night
concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines and other like fraudu-
lent exploitations."" Moreover, it does not seem likely that, even on
the "weighing of interest" test, a different result would be reached.
There does not seem to be any need for the application of a single
law in this instance. It has been suggested that there is no reason
why, when a corporation is performing an act that an individual is
also capable of performing (e.g., offering and selling stock to the
public), the purchaser's rights ought not to vary depending on the
state in which he deals with the corporation."
Therefore, if the proposition is accepted that a state has a suffiicent
interest in the protection of its citizens with respect to stock schemes,
that interest ought constitutionally to support its regulating offers and
sales via the mails; and, logically, that power ought to extend even
to the case of the single offer, or the isolated sale, no matter what the
93 London, Paris & American Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 601, 609 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902):
It is true the courts in California cannot control the internal affairs of any
foreign corporation. Such matters are to be conducted in pursuance of and in
compliance with the provisions of the charter of the foreign corporation, and
the laws of the country where it was created; but in the management and
method of its business affairs in California with the citizens and residents
thereof, in the sale or disposition or transfer of the shares of stock, it must
conform to the laws of California in relation to such matters . . . . (Emphasis
added.)
See also Williams v. Gaylord, 186 U.S. 157 (1902); Gillis v. Pan American W. Petroleum
Co., 3 Cal. 2d 294, 44 P.2d 311 (1935); Biddle v. Smith, 148 Tenn. 489, 256 S.W.
453 (1923).
94 See, e.g., Kelly v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 139 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 791 (1944).
96 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
ge Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law
and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1124 (1958).
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medium may happen to be.° 7 As the survey shows, a great majority
of the state administrators construe their statutes to reach these limits.
In considering this proffered opinion, however, it might be remem-
bered that the Supreme Court has only sustained statutes in the cases
of companies which carried on a continuous selling effort in the regu-
lating state.
1. The Uniform Securities Act." The act, in section 414, pro-
vides that an offer is "made in this state" both when the offer "origi-
nates from this state" or "is directed by the offeror to this state.'
This solves the uncertainty of the question of where the offer is
"made," pointed up especially by Doherty. The section puts a special
emphasis on the interest of the individual in compliability and fair-
ness, when it excludes from its definition of "offer" newspapers published
outside the state, and radio and television programs originating outside
the state.' However, it is still possible for the newspaper or the
television station to violate the statute if it accepts an "offer to buy"
—made as a result of the advertisement—"in this state.""' The
section represents a maximizing both of the state's interest in regu-
lation and protection, and the individual's interest in certainty and
a "just" application of the law."
II. THE WESTERN AIR LINES CASE
A. THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Section 25500 of the California Code"' provides that "no com-
pany shall sell any security of its own issue . . . or offer for 'sale,
negotiate for the sale of, or take subscriptions for any such security,
until it has first applied for and secured from the commissioner a
97 The case of Hardy v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 2d 698, 209 P.2d 839
(1949), which appears to be an instance of an isolated sale, may support this proposition.




702 See Uniform Securities Act 	 401(c) (4) which excludes from the definition of
"Broker-Dealer" any person "who has no place of business in this state if . . . during
any period of twelve consecutive months he does not direct more than fifteen offers
to sell or buy into this state . . . whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is
then present in this state," and 401(f)(6) which makes the same exclusion for
"Investment adviser," fixing the number at five, instead of fifteen, and using the
term "business communications" instead of "offers to sell or buy." These two sections
have been adopted by: Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. H 35-6-21(c), 35-6-21(1) (Supp.
1959); Ark. Stat. 44 67-1247(c), 67-1247(f) (Supp. 1961); Hawaii Rev. Laws II§ 199-1
(c), 199-1(1) (1955); Okla. Stat. Ann. H 2(c), 2(f) (Supp. 1961). Code Va. 13.1-501
(c) (1950), adopts with some changes 	 40I(c); and N.M. Stat.
	 48-18-17(h) (Supp.
1961) adopts with only a slight change 401(f),
703 Cal. Corp. Code § 25500.
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permit authorizing it so to do." Section 25003(a) expressly defines
"company" to include all domestic and foreign corporations. Section
25009 defines "sale" or "sell" as including all of the following:
". . . every disposition or attempt to dispose of a security or interest
in a security for value . . . an offer to sell; an attempt to sell; a
solicitation of a sale; an option of sale; a contract of sale; a taking
of a subscription; an exchange; any change in the rights, preferences,
priviliges or restrictions on outstanding securities. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) This last section, beginning with "any change," was added
in 1945. Prior to that time, the practice had been to bring cases of
"changes in rights, preferences, etc." under the heading of "ex-
change.' ,104 The wording of the 1945 amendment encompasses those
"changes in rights" which are brought about by amendments to the
charter; but as the words of the statute are not limited to that case
alone, the section might conceivably include "changes" brought about
by amendments to the by-laws, or possibly by resolutions of share-
holders or directors. In enforcing these provisions of its code, Cali-
fornia has been concentrating in the area of "changes" brought about
by charter amendments, but what shall be said about this area of
enforcement applies equally to the case of by-law or resolution
"changes" as respects the constitutionality of California regulation.
Section 25507 provides for the issuance of a permit "authorizing
it to issue and dispose of securities" if the commissioner finds that:
. . . the proposed plan of business of the applicant and the
proposed issuance of securities are fair, just and equitable
. . . that the applicant intends to conduct its business fairly
and honestly . . . and that the securities that it proposes
to issue and the method to be used by it in issuing or
disposing of them are not such as, in his opinion, will work
a fraud upon the purchaser thereof. . . .
Section 25510, applying specifically to the case of "exchanges" of
securities, and a bit more burdensome than section 25507, provides:
When application is made for a permit to issue se-
curities in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding
securities . . . the Commissioner is and has been authorized
to approve the terms and conditions of such issuance and
exchange and the fairness of such terms and conditions, after
a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions, at
which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities
104 Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate
Securities Act: II, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 344, 350-59 (1946).
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in such exchange have the right to appear. After such
hearing the Commissioner may refuse a permit authorizing
such exchange if in his opinion the plan is not fair, just, or
equitable to all security holders affected. (Emphasis added.)
As noted above, the legislative history of the statute interpreted "ex-
change," in the earlier version of section 25009, to mean what is now in-
cluded under the heading of "any change" in the present section 25009.
The construction which the California Administrators have put on
the statute is such that although "any change" has now come into
its own, as it were, in the definition of "sale," such "changes" still
fall under the heading "exchange."'" The reason for this is to make
applicable section 25510, providing for this discretionary power in
the Commissioner. The court in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Stephenson,
Commissioner of Corporations')
 said that the question of an "ex-
change" was not before respondent, notwithstanding his findings of
fact and conclusions, and was not a part of its review.m A court,
therefore, has not been able to review this problem of whether sec-
tion 25510 applies to "changes in rights."
Section 26100 provides that "every security of its own issue sold
or issued by any company without a permit . . . is void."'"
1. The Western Air Lines Case. Plaintiff, Western Air Lines,
Inc., is a Delaware corporation qualified to do and doing business
in the State of California. The principal offices of Western are in
Los Angeles; the minute books and other corporate records are kept
at that office. During the last several years it has been the practice
108 See Brief for Appellants, pp. 29-48, Western Air Lines, Inc., v. Sobieski,
Comm'r, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
1°° Blue Sky L. Rep. 	 70,396 (Calif. Super. Ct., L.A. County, July 17, 1958).
107 Id. at 65,798. The District Court did not examine the question either. Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, Comm'r, supra note 105.
108 The word "issue" has presented a number of definitional problems, and these
problems stem largely from the period when the California statute regulated in terms
of "issues" of securities. For example, 26100 formerly read: "Every security issued
by any company without a permit . . . is void." The term "issue" was defined by
Blythe v. Doheny, 73 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 1934): ""'to issue" as defined by the
lexicographers, signifies to send out; to put in circulation. In a popular sense, a corpora-
tion engaged in organization is said to issue stock when it obtains subscriptions for
it... " citing American Pig-Iron Storage Co. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 56 N.J.L.
389, 394, 29 Atl. 160, 161 (1894). See also Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long, 4
Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935); Rhoades v. Townsend, 139 Cal. App. 121, 33 P.2d 860
(1954) ; Dahlquist, supra note 104, at 345. These problems are no longer as pressing as
they once were, inasmuch as the statute now regulates in terms of "sales."
For a comment on the "void-voidable" distinction see text supra at note 54.
Oregon is the only other state which retains "void" terminology in its statute: Ore.
Rev. Stat. 59.250 (1955). California, however, is the only state which "voids" the
"security" as opposed to the "sale," and this, too, raises constitutional issues dis-
cussed below. See Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 137 (1958).
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of Western to hold four regular quarterly meetings of the board of
directors per annum, two in California and two outside. The corpo-
ration has two transfer agents, one in Los Angeles and one in New
York, and the Los Angeles transfer agent keeps the stock records.
Another set of the stock records is kept by the Corporation Trust
Company in Delaware. According to figures compiled by Western
for a representative month, January, 1957, more than fifty-five per
cent of the passengers flown by the corporation travelled between
points originating or terminating within the State of California, and
approximately thirty-four per cent of all passengers flown by the cor-
poration during said month travelled between points originating
or terminating within California. More than three quarters of all
property (other than flight equipment) owned by Western is situated
within California and less than one quarter of such property is scat-
tered throughout numerous other states; the principal facilities for
maintenance and overhaul are at Los Angeles. Approximately one
half of the amount paid by Western for rentals on leaseholds and
landing leases is paid with respect to property situated within Cali-
fornia, with the balance paid for property in other states. And approx-
imately three fifths of its total wages and salaries are paid to employees
in California with the remaining two fifths paid to employees in other
states, all such payments being made from California. The main
bank account of Western, from which bills are paid, is maintained
in California, and at least twice as much money is maintained in
California banks as in the banks of all other states combined Cali-
fornia residents are the holders of over thirty per cent of the out-
standing stock.
Western's certificate of incorporation, as permitted by the law of
Delaware,"° contained an article providing for cumulative voting
by stockholders in the election of its directors. Another article reserved
the right to "amend, alter, change or repeal any provision" in the
certificate in the manner prescribed by statute. All the certificates of
stock issued by Western contained a provision to the effect that by
the acceptance thereof the holder "assents to and agrees to be bound"
by all of the provisions of the certificate and amendments thereto.
The Delaware corporation lawn°
 provides that any Delaware corpo-
ration may amend its certificate. Western's board of directors, in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Delaware statute,
on July 12-13, 1956, adopted resolutions setting forth the amendment
desired, which would delete cumulative voting from the charter. This
109 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, fi 214 (1953).
110 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 5 242 (1953).
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meeting was held in Nevada. The directors authorized the president
and secretary to call a special meeting of Western's stockholders on
Sept. 12, 1956, to consider this amendment. On July 31, 1956, West-
ern's secretary, in Los Angeles, mailed to all shareholders a notice of
the special meeting together with a proxy statement and form of
proxy. Pursuant to the regulations of the California commission,
Western, when so advised by the commission, filed an application for
a "negotiating permit.' This permit was issued, and by this permit
the commission approved the use of such proxies as had, prior to the
date of such application, been received and which were not thereafter
revoked 1 12
 On October 10, 1956, the special stockholders' meeting
was held in Los Angeles and the resolution to delete cumulative voting
was passed by a majority of those shares voting, and of the total shares
outstanding. The next day Western filed an application seeking a
permit authorizing it to consummate a "change in the rights and
priviliges" on its outstanding stock by effecting an amendment to its
certificate. This application was eventually denied,' and Western
commenced an action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
seeking judicial review of the commission's actions and praying that
a writ of mandate issue directing the commissioner either to grant
the permit applied for or to dismiss the proceeding in which said
permit was sought."'
111 Cal. Administrative Code, tit. 10, H 759-62 (1956). The commissioner contended
that the preliminary step of soliciting the shareholders to effect such a change in the
rights or preferences required a "negotiating permit."
112 The findings of both courts is at variance with the finding of the commission,
The commission took the position that the issuance of the "negotiating permit" did not
validate the proxies solicited prior thereto; this, of course, meant that the commission
found that a majority did not vote for the repeal of cumulative voting while the
court found that they did. Brief for Appellants, app. A, pp. 50, 66. Western Air Lines,
Inc. v. Sobieski, Comm'r, supra note 105.
113 it may be useful at this stage to note why the commission denied the permit.
Although the Delaware statute makes cumulative voting optional, it is mandatory for
California corporations: Cal. Corp. Code § 2235. Thus California has a very strong
interest in cumulative voting. On October 9, 1959, amendments were adopted to the
California Administrative Code laying down the policy that applications for permits for
the sale, by foreign corporations, of common stock without cumulative voting rights, or
with limited or non-voting rights, will be considered by the commissioner "with dis-
favor": Cal. Administrative Code, tit. 10, §1 367.1, 843, 844 (1959). Although it now
looks as if the commission will be very hard on applications of corporations without
cumulative voting, prior to this time, and at the time of the hearing in Western Air
Lines, there was no express policy along these lines; in fact, it was quite possible for
the application of a foreign corporation to be granted even though there was no
cumulative voting: Western States Petroleum Co., Inc., file no. LA-165414, Calif. Div.
of Corps., Dec. 8, 1959. (The plan in this last-mentioned case was set up and the
stockholders circularized prior to the publication of the above decision and amendments
on cumulative voting; the commissioner, in the Western States case said that he did
not "believe in retroactive rulings." Id. at 10.)
114 This summary of the facts is culled from the opinions of the courts in Blue
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The commission's position is that the proposed amendment
would constitute a "change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or
restrictions on outstanding securities" of Western and, accordingly,
would be a "sale" within the meaning of section 25009 of the Cor-
poration Code, and that the solicitation of proxies in connection with
the proposed amendment constituted a "sale" of securities within the
meaning of that section. Thus, the resultant conclusion is that
Western may not solicit proxies, or hold a stockholder meeting to pass
on the amendment, nor should the amendment be filed in Delaware
until the corporation has first applied for and obtained the requisite
permits.'
The Superior Court believed that there was only one issue for
determination, i.e., whether the commissioner proceeded in excess of
his jurisdiction. The court held that there was no violation of the
blue sky law of that state: "no stock is to be 'sold,' nor has there
been any solicitation to 'sell' in California.'" Furthermore, the
court said that if the statute were to be interpreted to mean that
Western had committed a violation, then the statute would be un-
constitutional under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion."' The District Court reversed, holding that the commissioner
had jurisdiction to act in this matter, "particularly where such cor-
poration does a substantial amount of business within the State."'
2. Extra-territoriality and Statutory Construction. There is one
very important rule which both courts adopt in this case: the acts
which a blue sky law prohibit or regulate (viz. "sales" of securities,
"changes in the rights" on securities, "attempts to" change the
rights on securities)"° must be acts occurring within the state; or, at
Sky L. Rep. 70,396 (Calif. Super. Ct., LA. County, July 17, 1958) and in 12 Cal.
Rptr. 719 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), and from "Findings of Fact and Conclusions" of the
commission and "Amended and Corrected Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"
of the Superior Court as reproduced in the Brief for Appellants, app. A, pp. 1-53, app.
B, pp. 54-80.
115 The commissioner also would contend that the solicitation of proxies and the
change of rights would fall under the heading of "attempt to . . . exchange" and
"exchange"; see discussion supra.
IN Blue Sky L. Rep. 70,396, at 65,796.
117 Ibid.
118 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The court remanded the case to the Superior Court with
instructions to review the merits, that is, to see whether there was substantial evidence
to support the commissioner's findings in denying Western's application.
119 Section 25009 provides that "sale" includes "an attempt to sell"; "sale" or
"sell" includes "any change in the rights, preferences, privileges. . .." The wording
of the statute seems to be such that for the word, "sell;" in "an attempt to sell," it is
possible to substitute "change . . . the rights, preferences, privileges. . . ." This is the
interpretation followed by the commission, for they contended that a solicitation of
proxies is a "sale" within the meaning of the act. Blue Sky L. Rep. if 70,396, at 65,794.
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least to this extent a statute can have no extra-territorial effect.'
This rule is acknowledged by the commissioner, for he attempts to
argue, in the brief to the District Court that the "change in the
rights," which would be effected by filing of the amendment in
Delaware, will take place in California.'" On this principle, then,
unless the "change in the rights" or the "attempt to" change the
rights on the securities takes place in California, its blue sky law is
inapplicable.'"
An "attempt to" change the rights on the outstanding securities,
within the meaning of section 25009, did take place in California,
in the form of proxy solicitation and a special stockholders' meeting.
Leaving aside the question of constitutionality, the California statute
does give the commissioner in this case jurisdiction to regulate acts
which constituted an "attempt to sell (viz. change rights on)" a
security.'" To this extent the Superior Court is wrong in saying that
no "solicitation to sell" took place in California within the meaning
of section 25009. 124 What the Superior Court may be saying is that
12° McBreen v. Iceco, 12 III. App. 2d 372, 377, 139 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1956) (It
was held that a complaint under the Illinois securities act which failed to allege facts
showing that the sale occurred in the state did not allege a cause of action: "There
is no right of action under the statute unless the sale complained of took place in
Illinois."); Los Angeles Fisheries Inc. v. Crook, 47 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1931); Brocalsa
Chemical Co. v, Langsenkamp, 32 F.2d 725 (fith Cir. 1929); Robbins v. Pacific
Eastern Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 241, 65 P.2d 42 (1937); Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 206,
63 P.2d 611, 617 (1936); Estate of Suckow, 192 Wis. 124, 212 N.W. 280 (1927). See
also Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1917) ; Gillis v. Pan American
Western Pet. Co., 3 Cal. 2d 249, 254, 44 P.2d 311, 313-14 (1935); People v. J. O.
Beckman & Co,, 347 III. 92, 97, 179 N.E. 435, 437 (1932) ; Fletcher, Private Corporations
§ 6742 (perm. ed. rev. 1954); Dahlquist, supra note 104, at 380. Therefore, as long
as the prohibited acts occur within the state, the person committing same has violated
the statute and is subject to its civil and criminal penalties: People v. Sears, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 773, 791, 292 P.2d 663, 674 (1956) ("The Corporate Securities Act clearly
prohibits a foreign corporation from soliciting in California a sale of stock of its own
issue without first securing a permit, even though in good faith the issuance of the
stock and transfer of title are to take place in a foreign state.") ; People v. Rankin,
169 Cal. App. 2d 150, 337 P.2d 182 (1959); B. C. Turf & Country Club, Ltd. v.
Daugherty, 94 Cal. App. 2d 320, 210 P.2d 760 (1949) ; People ex rd. Brundage v. Hill
Top Metals Mining Co., 300 III. 564, 133 N.E. 303 (1921); People v. Augustine, 232
Mich. 29, 204 N.W. 747 (1925). See State v. Swain, 147 Ore. 207, 31 P.2d 745 (1934).
121 Brief for Appellants, at p. 93.
122 See note 120 supra.
122 The existence of proxy solicitation in California gives the commissioner the
power to enjoin such solicitation and hold up the plan until he passes on its fairness,
for Regulation 780 (Cal. Administrative Code tit. 10, § 780 (1956)) says: "Such hearing
may be held either in connection with the consideration of an application for a negotiating
permit ... or subsequent to issuance of such a permit and prior to the issuance of a
definitive permit. . . ." Thus, the commissioner can hold hearings on the "negotiating
permit," which is what the corporation applies for when it wants to get permission
to solicit proxies; or, on the definitive permit.
124 Blue Sky L. Rep. ¶ 70,396, at 65,796.
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an interpretation of the statute which would treat these acts (proxy
solicitation for, and a stockholders' meeting to vote on, the elimina-
tion of cumulative voting) as a "sale" within the meaning of the
statute would be contrary to full faith and credit.
But there is a question as to whether the actual "change in the
rights" on the securities took place in California. The Superior Court
places the "situs" of the "change" in Delaware. 125 It is not clear
whether the District Court agrees,'" but that court is not troubled
by this in view of its finding that the substantial amount of business
performed by Western in California, and the acts which took place
in California in furtherance of the scheme to eliminate cumulative
voting, were sufficient to give the commissioner jurisdiction. 1"
125 It appears to this Court that, notwithstanding the prohibition in section
25009, of the Corporations Code, the exchange of petitioner's outstanding stock,
if any, may, and any change in the "rights, preferences, privileges, or re-
strictions" as to such outstanding stock will certainly be, accomplished outside
of the State of California by the means of the filing and recording of the
Certificate of Amendment in the appropriate offices in Delaware. It is this
Court's opinion that neither of such actions is within the permit requirements
of the California "Corporate Securities Law" . . . .
Blue Sky L. Rep. l[ 70,396, at 65,797.
126 12 Cal. Rptr. at 728. It is probably meaningless to talk about the "situs" of a
"change in rights." The words "right" or "change in rights" are not words descriptive
of actual things in the real world; rather, they are expressions which describe relations
between persons. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. Rev. 37, 45
(1954). (Mr. Hart argues that the primary purpose of words such as "a legal right"
is not to stand for or describe any thing, but to describe a distinct function. In order
to define "a legal right" it is necessary to take a sentence in which the words appear
and specify the conditions under which the whole sentence is true.) These relations do not
have a "situs" anywhere; it is not meaningful to talk about an intangible such as the
legal relation of a "change in rights" being situated somewhere in space. The view seems
to be that the "situs" of an intangible is merely a legal conclusion to the problem of
whether a state should, as a matter of policy, be able to regulate this legal relationship.
Pomerance, The "Situs" of Stock, 17 Cornell L.Q. 43, 70-71 (1931): "The idea of a single
fixed 'situs' of stock has proved a source of great confusion; results indicate that there
is no such thing. 'Situs' is a term applied to a number of juristic results, which differ
from one another quite properly, since they involve different considerations and are
based upon varying policies. . . . What is important is that artificial theories of
'situs' should cease to rule and should be abandoned as misleading and more than
useless, that control over stock always should be justifiable as a matter of policy and
convenience." See also Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 285, 286 (1953); cf. Wood, Reaching
Shares of Stock, 38 W. Va. L.Q. 219 (1952). On this view the question whether a
"change in rights" took place in California is really: "Should California as a matter
of policy be able to regulate this type of transaction ?"
127 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The court also mentions, as further support to its finding
of jurisdiction, the fact that Western's predecessor was a California corporation, and
that the California commissioner granted Western a permit in 1929 to exchange its
shares for all the outstanding shares of the California predecessor. At that time Western
represented to the commissioner that the shareholders of the California corporation
would "not be hurt" in any way by the exchange: "Thus it is apparent that the
condition agreed to by Western as a basis for the original exchange of stock now
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The rule, therefore, seems to be that when a foreign corporation,
particularly one which does a "substantial" amount of business in
California, having a "substantial" number of California stockholders,
performs a "substantial" number of acts in California in furtherance
of its intent to amend its charter so as to "change" in any way the
rights of its shareholders, it is "selling" a security under the Cali-
fornia blue sky law, despite the fact that the filing of the amendment
takes place in another state, and it must prior to filing obtain a
permit. It is plain to see that there are a host of uncertainties and
ambiguities inherent in this rule.
3. Constitutionality. The next question is whether the California
blue sky law, as construed by the District Court is unconstitutional
on its face, or is unconstitutional in its application in any given case.
a. The Internal Affairs  Rule. The basis of the Superior Court's
determination of unconstitutionality seems to be that the transactions
are "internal affairs" of a foreign corporation; or, that under the
Constitution only Delaware can regulate these "internal affairs."
The classical "internal affairs" rule may be stated thus: a
state has no visitorial powers over foreign corporations and ordinarily
its courts will not interfere in their internal affairs and manage ;
ment.'' This is a rule invoked when a court does not wish to exercise
its jurisdiction over a particular action or suit. This rule also applies
in the federal courts, but it seems to be part of the larger doctrine
of "forum non conveniens." 1" The rule is particularly applied in
cases which will involve the construction and interpretation of a
statute of the state of the corporation's creation, or a broad question
tacitly prevents the company from depriving its shareholders of a right which they
would now have had if the 1929 exchange had not taken place." Ibid.
128 Kelly v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 139 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 791 (1944); Hirshon v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa.
1944) ; Ellis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 237 Ala. 492, 187 So. 434 (1939) ; Sharp v.
Big Jim Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940); Miles v. Woodward, 115
Cal. 308, 46 Pac. 1076 (1896), modified, 115 Cal. 308, 47 Pac. 360 (1897); Graeser v.
Phoenix Fin. Co., 218 Iowa 1112, 254 N.W. 859 (1934) ; Pratt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
157 Kan. 710, 145 P.2d 113 (1944); Kimball v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 157 Mass. 7,
31 N.E. 697 (1892); Reed v. Woodmen of World, 94 Mont. 374, 22 P.2d 819 (1933) ;
Allen v. Montana Ref. Co., 71 Mont. 105, 227 Pac. 582 (1924).
129 Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Williams v. Green Bay
& Western Ry., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123
(1933). See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908 (1947);
Notes, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 413 (1946), 42 Iowa L. Rev. 90 (1956) ; Comment, 56 Yale
L. J. 1234 (1947). Some state courts also consider the rule as part of the doctrine of
"forum non conveniens." Kelly v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 139 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 791 (1944) ; Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303
Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482 (1939); Royal China v. Regal China Corp., 304 N.Y. 309, 107
N.E.2d 461 (1952) ; Goldstein v. Lightner, 266 App. Div. 357, 42 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1943).
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of that state's public policy; 1" and, in cases where proceedings
are pending in the domiciliary state."' It has been said that the
rule is based on considerations of policy and propriety, 132 or on the
inability or want of power in the courts to enforce or effectuate
their orders or decrees." 3 To this rule, which is only discretionary,'"
there are two exceptions: (1) it is generally held to be inapplicable
where there are allegations of fraud or conscious wrongdoing; 135
(2) it is inapplicable to a corporation which is "foreign" in a technical
sense only.'"
130 Kelly v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 139 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 791 (1944); Mayer v. Oxidation Products Co., 110 N.J. Eq. 141, 159 Atl. 377
(1932).
131 Healey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 48 F. Supp. 207 (M.D.N.C. 1942);
Wright v. Post, 268 Mass. 126, 167 N.E. 278 (1929).
132 Hirshon v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1944) ;
Ellis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 237 Ala. 492, 187 So. 434 (1939); State v. Iowa Southern
Util. Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W. 2d 372, supplemental opinion, 4 N.W.2d
869 (1942); State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949) (same case on the merits).
133 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 US. 123 (1933) ; United Milk Prod. Corp.
v. Lovell, 75 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 751 (1935); Edwards v.
Schillinger, 245 III. 231, 91 N.E. 1048 (1910); North State Copper & Gold Min. Co. v.
Field, 64 Md. 151, 20 Atl. 1039 (1885) ; Allen v. Montana Refining Co., 71 Mont. 105,
227 Pac. 582 (1924); Babcock v. Schuylkill & L. V. Ry., 56 Hun. 649, 9 N.Y. Supp.
845 (1890); Corry v. Barre Granite & Quarry Co., 91 Vt. 413, 101 Atl. 38 (1917).
184 United Milk Prod. Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S.
751 (1935); American Creosote Works v. Powell, 298 Fed. 417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
265 U.S. 595 (1924); Mayer v. Oxidation Products Co., 110 N.J. Eq. 141, 159 At].
377 (1932); Babcock v. Schuylkill & L. V. Ry., 56 Hun. 649, 9 N.Y. Supp. 845 (1890).
131 Lesnick v. Public Industrial Corp., 144 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1944); Overfield
v. Pennroad Corp., 133 F.2d 6 (3d Cir. 1940); United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell,
75 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 751 (1935); American Creosote Works v.
Powell, 298 Fed. 417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 595 (1924); Hirshon v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1944); Edwards v. Schillinger, 245
DI. 231, 91 N.E. 1048 (1910); Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1,
20 N E 2d 482 (1939); Tarlow v. Archbell, 47 N.YS.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Werner v.
Becker, 43 N.Y.S.2d 294, aid., 296 App. Div. 837, 70 N.E.2d 556, 56 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1945); Goldstein v. Lightner, 266 App. Div. 357, 42 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1943); Ernst v.
Rutherford & Boiling Springs Gas Co., 38 App. Div. 388, 56 N.Y. Supp. 403 (1899);
Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, 83 Atl. 307 (1912). Contra, Sternfeld v. Toxaway
Tanning Co., 290 N.Y. 294, 49 N.E.2d 145 (1943). See Coleman, Corporate Dividends
and the Conflict of Laws, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 435 (1950). For a general discussion of
the "internal affairs" rule see Fletcher, Private Corporations §§ 8425-45 (rev. perm. ed.
1933).
136 State v. Iowa So. Util. Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, supple-
mental opinion, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942) ; State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298,
31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949) (same case on the merits);
United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S.
751 (1935) ; Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1933); Sharp v.
Big Jim Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940) ; Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine
Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482 (1939); Hayman v. Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d




The courts have used the rule in refusing to take jurisdiction
where a plaintiff shareholder is seeking to compel a foreign corpora-
tion to pay a dividend,'" or to enjoin the corporation from paying
a dividend.'" They have used it in refusing to take jurisdiction of
suits to compel the issuance of shares of stock,'" or to enjoin the
issuance of stock.'" And the rule has also been employed where
the courts have refused to take jurisdiction of a shareholder's suit
seeking to cancel or void shares of stock of a foreign corporation,'
or seeking to have the court grant voting power to the suitor—voting
power being denied by the foreign certificate of incorporation,' or
praying that the court void a merger or reorganization of a foreign
corporation.'"
Apart from the fact that the "internal affairs" rule is one which
is considered to be on its way out,'"" is concerned with judicial
and not legislative jurisdiction. There are a number of reasons why
a court declines jurisdiction (viz. lack of power in the forum to en-
force its decrees, reluctance to construe a foreign statute or another
state's public policy, proceedings pending in another state), but, this
137 Goldstein v. Lightner, 266 App. Div. 357, 42 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1943); Fox v.
Allied Stores, 252 App. Div. 675, 300 N.Y. Supp. 1254 (1937).
138 Hamilton v. United Laundries, 111 N.J. Eq. 78, 161 Atl. 347 (1932) ,
133 Boyette v. Preston Motors Corp., 206 Ala. 240, 89 So. 746 (1921); Kansas &
R. R. Construction Co. v. Topeka, S. & W. Ry., 135 Mass. 34 (1883); cf. Southern
Sierras Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 205 Cal. 479, 271 Pac. 747 (1928). Contra,
Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 61 N.W. 324 (1894); Babcock v.
Schuylkill & L. V. Ry., 56 Hun. 649, 9 N.Y. Supp. 845 (1890). See also In re Fryeburg
Water Co., 79 N.H. 123, 106 Atl. 225 (1919). (This was a case in which a Maine
corporation sought to compel the New Hampshire public service commission to approve
that portion of a stock dividend which was represented by its capital investment in
New Hampshire; it was a request for the approval by the commission of an increase of
its capital stock, which had been authorized by the State of Maine. Held: the public
service commission had no power to approve this stock dividend.)
143 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Kimball v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 157 Mass. 7, 31 N.E. 697 (1892). Contra, Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp.,
63 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1933). (This would seem to be a case of a corporation foreign
in a technical sense only.)
141 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Allen v. Montana Re-
fining Co., 71 Mont. 105, 227 Pac. 582 (1924); Sternfeld v. Toxaway Tanning Co.,
290 N.Y. 294, 49 N.E.2d 145 (1943); cf. Mau v. Montana Pacific Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch.
114, 141 Atl. 828 (1928). Contra, American Creosote Works v. Powell, 298 Fed. 417 (5th
Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 595 (1924) (This would seem to come under the
fraud exception); State v. Iowa So. Util. Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d
372, supplemental opinion, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942); State ex rd. Weede v. Bechtel,
239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949) (same case
on the merits).
142 Allen v. Montana Refining Co., 71 Mont. 105, 227 Pac. 582 (1924).
143 Harris v. Weiss Eng'r Corp., 267 App. Div. 96, 44 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1943);
Meisse v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 264 App. Div. 373, 35 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1942).
144 Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold & Reese, Cases And Materials On Conflict Of
Laws 225 (4th ed. 1957).
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discretionary judicial doctrine is different from the present question
of whether a state can constitutionally regulate certain conduct. The
classical "internal affairs" rule is not relevant on this issue.
b. The Case Law. The cases of Transportation Bldg. Co.
v. Daugherty,' Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan,'" Schroe-
ter v. Bartlett Syndicate Bldg. Corp." and Southern Sierras Power
Co. v. Railroad Commission,'" cited by the Superior Court are of
145 74 Cal. App. 2d 604, 169 P.2d 470 (1946), hearing denied, Cal. Sup. Ct., July
18, 1946. In that case a California corporation•had applied to the corporation commis-
sioner for a permit to amend its articles, which amendment would bring about certain
changes in the capital stock structure. At that time the California blue sky law directed
the commissioner to grant a permit if he found "the proposed plan of business not
unfair, unjust or inequitable." The commissioner denied the permit. The corporation
sought a writ of mandate, and that writ was granted when the court found that the
plan was not "unfair, unjust or inequitable." Apart from the fact that this case has
been criticized because the superior court exercised its own judgment rather than the
"substantial evidence" rule of McDonough v. Goodsell, 13 Cal. 2d 741, 91 P.2d
1035 (1939) (see Brief for Appellants, pp. 43-44), the case does not raise the prob-
lem of legislative jurisdiction over the "internal affairs" of a foreign corporation. See
Western Airlines v. Sobieski, Comm'r, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
146 198 Cal. 618, 246 Pac. 796 (1926). Petitioner brought an application for the
issuance of a writ of mandate to require the secretary of state of California to receive
and file in his office a duly certified copy of the petitioner's charter, together with
certain other required documents and to accept the amount of the license fee. These
had been tendered as a prerequisite to the qualification of petitioner to transact business
in California. The application had been denied because the stock capitalization of the
corporation was represented, by shares of different par values; i.e., if that corporation
had attempted to organize in California with a like stock structure, it would not have
received a charter. Held' writ issued. The fact that a foreign corporation has been
given powers which a domestic corporation does not possess does not mean that they
may not be permitted to enter such other states and transact business therein under the
doctrine of comity, "in the absence of express constitutional or statutory inhibitions on
the part of those states which such foreign corporations thus seek to enter." (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 624; 246 Pac. at 800. The last sentence merely states the issue being dealt
with in the text: given certain express statutory inhibitions, can the foreign corporation
stiff transact business free of these inhibitions?
147 8 Cal. 2d 12, 67 P.2d 824 (1936). The plaintiff, a shareholder in the defendant
domestic corporation, recovered judgment for amounts paid by him on certain assess-
ments on his stock. The court below found that the corporation had no authority to
levy assessments. The controversy was over a change in the law. The law at the time
the corporation was formed was to the effect that the board of directors could levy
assessments. That law was changed to forbid assessments unless the articles so provided.
Although prior to the levy in this case the articles did not allow assessments, the
corporation argued on appeal that its right to assess must be measured by the way the
law stood originally; to measure their rights by the later law would constitute an
impairment of the obligations of contract. Held: judgment affirmed. The "reserved
power" of the State of California gives the state the right to alter or amend its
"contract" with its corporations, and pursuant to that right the state could alter the
law on assessments without impairing any contract rights. Moreover, the new statute did
not completely take away the right to assess; the right could now exist only under
certain conditions. This case is not particularly helpful on the issue of legislative juris-
diction over foreign corporations.
148 205 Cal. 479, 271 Pac. 747 (1928). The petitioner sought a writ of mandate
414
STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
very little help on this issue. There are some cases which seem to
support the Superior Court's interpretation of the full faith and
credit clause. 149 One such case is Miles v. Woodward.'" There a
shareholder of a California corporation brought an action against
a director to recover damages for a violation of the provisions of a
statute requiring the making, posting and filing of weekly reports,
designed for the protection of shareholders. The defendant argued,
inter alia, that the act was unconstitutional for the reason that it
operated only on domestic corporations and thereby allowed foreign
corporations to transact business within California on more favorable
conditions than are prescribed by law for similar corporations or-
ganized under California law. The court held, as to this contention,
that the statute did not discriminate in favor of foreign corporations,
because California could not prescribe this kind of legislation for
foreign corporations anyway:
to compel the railroad commission to issue its permit for the issuance of certain stock.
The commissioner declined its permit on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the
issuance of stock by a foreign corporation. Held: the petition was denied. The opinion
is confused, but the court seems to be saying that the Public Utilities Act of California
regulating the issuance of stock, by its terms, does not apply to foreign corporations.
See Gillis v. Pan American Western Petroleum Co., 3 Cal. 2d 249, 252, 44 P.2d 311,
313 (1935) ; Dahlquist, supra note 104, at 380. See Western Air Lines v. Sobieski,
Comm'r, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26. However; the court in Southern makes some
surprising statements. For instance, they say that, "While the term 'internal affairs' is
more or less indefinite, there can be no question but that the issuance of stock by a cor-
poration is purely an internal affair." 205 Cal. at 483, 271 Pac. at 748. Surely, the court
cannot mean that a state has no power to regulate the sale or issuance of stock of a
foreign corporation in California. See text supra at note 93. The court qualifies this
broad statement by saying that ". . . to entertain an action to compel its issuance would
dearly constitute the exercise of visitatorial powers over the corporation. . . ." 205
Cal. at 483, 271 Pac. at 748. However, this statement hardly seems to be relevant
to the facts of Southern. All this lessens the effect of an earlier dictum: "While the
legislature has the power to dictate under what terms and conditions foreign corpora-
tions may transact business in this state, this power does not extend so far as to give the
legislature the power to regulate or control the 'Ultra vires' acts of such corporations
concerning their internal affairs. Over such matters it has no control." Id. at 482, 271 Pac.
at 748.
14o In re Fryeburg Water Co., supra note 139. The facts of that case are distinguish-
able from Western Air Lines, but one statement of the court's is worthy of mention:
"If the amount of its capital stock is limited by the act of incorporation, the legis-
lature of another state where it happens to be engaged in business, has no power to
increase or diminish the amount of stock thus fixed and established . . . the petitioner's
request for the approval by the commission of an increase of its capital stock, which has
been authorized by the law of Maine, is misconceived, and is an application for the
exercise of power by the commission which it does not possess." (Emphasis added.)
79 N.H. at 124, 106 Atl. at 227. This can be read to mean that New Hampshire is
constitutionally inhibited from regulating or in any way tampering with, the capital
stock figure of a foreign corporation. See Western Air Lines v. Sobieski, Comm'r,
12 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
150 115 Cal. 308, 46 Pac. 1076 (1896), modified, 115 Cal. 308, 47 Pac. 360 (1897).
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The constitution was not designed to limit the powers
of the legislature when dealing with the organization and
government of corporations which are created by its own
will and act. Over such corporations it has and may exercise
full powers of control. Over the organization and internal
government of foreign corporations it has no such powers.
The laws of the state do not have extraterritorial force. It
would be meaningless for this state to try to legislate upon
the internal affairs of such foreign corporations, and it has
not attempted to do so."
The problem with this case is that it was decided in 1896, and
at that time state judicial concepts of permissible regulation of
foreign corporations were far more limited than what they are today.
For example, under the present California blue sky law, which was
originally adopted in 1917, 162 a good deal of material has to be filed
with the commission by foreign corporations before stock may be
issued.' Thus, Miles v. Woodward does not lend much support to
the Superior Court's view.
Other support may be found in the dicta of the oft-cited Mau v.
Montana Pacific Oil Co.'" In that case the jurisdiction of the Dela-
ware Chancery court was invoked to determine the validity of the
election of those directors of the Montana Pacific Oil Co., a Dela-
ware corporation, who were declared to have been elected directors
at a meeting held in Montana. The crucial point upon which the
dispute turned was whether or not 389,265 shares of stock standing
in the name of and voted by the defendant Montana Pacific Corpora-
tion, a Nevada corporation, were lawfully outstanding and therefore
entitled to vote. The legality of those shares was questioned on the
ground that they were issued by Montana Pacific Oil Co. in violation
of the California blue sky law, and were, therefore, void. The court
held that the stock was issued in Montana, and that the California
blue sky law was inapplicable. 155
 However, the court was prompted to
say a few words about the "voiding" provision of the California
statute: 1"
It is rather difficult to see on what ground a state may
rest a power to declare void stock issued by a foreign cor-
poration in compliance with the law of its domicile. .. .
151 Id. at 311, 46 Pac. at 1077.
152 Cal. Stat. c. 532 at 673 (1917).
183 Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25501-02; see also § 25515.
154 16 Del. Ch. 114, 141 All. 828 (1928).
155 Id. at 120, 141 Atl. at 831.
158 The present provision is in Cal. Corp. Code § 26100.
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If one state has the power to enact laws declaring void as
unlawfully issued the stock of a corporation of a sister
state, lawfully issued under the law of the domicile, it is
apparent that inextricable confusion is in danger of being
introduced into the internal affairs of corporations. The
membership in and the internal life of a state's corporate
creature will be subject to as many conflicting masters as
there are foreign jurisdictions. The logical result of such
a doctrine is that one state has the power in effect, though
not perhaps in form, to destroy the creatures of a sister
sovereignty, for if it can nullify its stock for one reason it
can for another. . . . Though the language of the section
is general and in point of form applicable to all corporations,
foreign as well as domestic, yet it is hardly to be doubted
but that the courts of that State would, in construing the
section, restrict the application of its general language to the
field of its appropriate domestic application. It is undoubt-
edly within the power of a state to regulate the sale of
securities, whether domestic or foreign, to the public and
to inflict penalties upon all those who make such sales in
violation of the statutes. It is doubtless likewise equally com-
petent for the state enacting such laws to provide for the
voiding of stock of its own creatures if sold in violation of
its law. But no court has gone so far as to say that the
legislative power can extend so far as to operate extra-
territorially by way of declaring to be void the stock of a
corporation created under the law of another sover-
eignty.'"
The California courts have expressly declined to follow this dictum.'"
157 16 Del. Ch. at 120-21, 141 Atl. at 831; cf. Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins,
17 Del. Ch. 356, 363, 152 Atl. 342, 346 (1930); Dunham v. Chemical Bank & Trust
Co., 180 Okla. 537, 71 P.2d 468 (1937); Coffield v. Ernsperger, 187 Okla. 79, 101
P.2d 251 (1940); Braniff v. Coffield, 199 Okla. 604, 190 P.2d 815 (1947). Even though
the stock is "voidable" at the behest of innocent purchasers (see text supra at note 54),
the court, in such an action by an innocent purchaser still has the power under
§ 26100 to declare the stock "void."
159 Gillis v. Pan American Western Pet. Co., 3 Cal. 2d 249, 254-55, 44 P.2d 311, 314
(1935). The court, in Gillis, is itself often confused about whether it is talking about
voiding the "security" or voiding the "issuance" of a security. At one point the court
says, after distinguishing a series of cases (including Mau), that: ". . . they are not
persuasive of the point that the state lacks the power to declare void the issuance of
securities." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 313, 44 P.2d at 252. Moreover, none of the cases
cited in Gillis lend any authority to the proposition that a state can declare void
the "security" of a foreign corporation for failure to comply with its blue sky law. Id.
at 253-54, 44 P.2d at 313-14.
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The question in applying, this case to the present issue is whether
there is a difference between "voiding" foreign stock and regulating
amendments to charters of, foreign corporations. If one utilizes the
so-called "governmental interest" test, generally adopted by the Su-
preme Court in interpreting the due process and full faith and credit
clauses,'" it is submitted that although California has an interest
in protecting its residents from fraudulent stock schemes, its interest
does not necessarily extend to "voiding" the stock; its residents are
equally protected by simply "voiding" the sale. This unnecessary ex-
tension of its power only causes unreasonable and unjustifiable con-
fusion. On the other hand, California has a very strong policy in
favor of cumulative voting and in seeing that a foreign corporation,
which does a substantial amount of business in the state, does not
deprive its California shareholders (over thirty per cent of the total
shares outstanding) of that chance of obtaining greater representa-
tion on the board. It is submitted that this is a sufficient "govern-
mental interest" to sustain' the constitutionality of the blue sky law
as applied to Western Air Lines.
Lastly, there is the case of Order of United Commercial Travel-
ler's v. Wolfe"' which re-affirmed the proposition that the rights of
membership in a fraternal beneficiary society are to be determined by
the law of the state of incorporation: It is not questioned that the
state attempting to regulate had a legitimate concern in seeking to
protect its residents. In the scales of "weighing" the national and
state interests, however, that concern lost out to the national need
for uniformity of treatment of all the members of the beneficiary
society. Order of United Commercial Traveller's is distinguishableill
and represents the application of a constitutional test not followed in
the great majority of Supreme Court cases and rejected by many
leading commentators. 182 The case is, at best, only weak authority in
support of the Superior Court's position.
c. Summary. Applying what appears to be the current test
for the due process and full faith and credit clauses, it is submitted
that as applied to the Western Air Lines case, the California blue
sky law is constitutional, and the District Court is correct, because
159 See pp. 386-89 supra.
760 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
161
 Order of United Commercial Travellers did not concern a business corporation
organized for profit; membership in a fraternal beneficiary society is not like being a
shareholder in a publicly held corporation and the Supreme Court has a special concern
in the stability and solvency of these societies; it was a 5-4 decision. The District
Court in Western Air Lines stated that the Supreme Court treats these cases of fraternal
beneficiary societies as unique. 12 Cal. Rptr. 726.
162 See pp. 386-88 supra and notes 19-22, 24-25 supra.
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California in this instance has a sufficient "governmental interest"
in regulating: there is the strong California policy in favor of
cumulative voting, more than thirty per cent of the shareholders
resident in California, a substantial amount of business done by the
corporation in California, proxy solicitation and a shareholders' meet-
ing in California, and the past history of the corporation.'"
Another way of expressing the existence of a strong "govern-
mental interest" in regulating the affairs of a foreign corporation is
to call the company a "pseudo-foreign" corporation,' the concept of
the "pseudo-foreign" corporation being an exception to the classical
"internal affairs" rule." An examination of the "pseudo-foreign"
corporation cases, however, shows that this exception has only been
applied where all or nearly all of the "foreign" corporation's property
and membership were situated in the regulating state.'"
An example of such a case, and one used by the commissioner
and the District Court, is State v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of
Delaware,'" which involved a Delaware corporation engaged solely
in the operation of public utilities in Iowa where all of its property
and assets were located. The board of directors of this corporation
met in Chicago to propose an amendment to the charter whereby a
reclassification of stock would be effected. By that reclassification, the
outstanding shares were to be changed into new shares upon the
filing of the amendment. The amendment was approved by a share-
holders' meeting held in Iowa, and the amended certificate was filed
in Delaware. Section 8412 of the Iowa Code of 1935 forbade domestic
corporations from issuing par value stock at less than par; section
8413 forbade such corporations from issuing such stock for any
consideration except cash without the permission of the executive
council; section 8433 made those sections applicable to foreign utility
corporations doing business in Iowa; and section 8437 declared
shares issued in violation of these statutes to be "void." The plaintiff
brought a statutory suit in equity in the name of the state of Iowa
against the corporation to cancel the shares issued on the recent
reclassification. The argument was forwarded that the new common
stock which had been issued was issued without consideration and
163 See note 127 supra.
164 Western Air Lines v. Sobieski, Comm'r, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727. See Latty, Pseudo-
Foreign Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 137 (1955).
165 See note 136 supra.
166 Ibid.
ler 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, supplemental opinion 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942); State
ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
918 (1949) (same case on the merits). See Western Air Lines v. Sobieski, Comm'r,
12 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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without obtaining permission from the executive council. The court
held, on defendant's motion to dismiss, that the Iowa statutes as
applied to the defendant corporation did not deny it due process
of law on the ground that such statutes would interfere with the
"internal affairs" of a foreign corporation.' 88
The first feature distinguishing that case from Western Air
Lines is that the Iowa statutes were designed not only for the pro-
tection of shareholders, but primarily for the protection of creditors.
It is a statute designed to forbid "watering" of stock. The state wants
to make certain that at least the amount of par outstanding is in the
till as a cushion for creditors. Thus, Iowa may have a stronger
concern to regulate in that case than in the instance where a state
is seeking to protect a class of persons who are already members of
a corporation and who became members with the understanding that
certain of their rights could be changed by charter amendment.
The second distinction is that the corporation in the Iowa case
had much stronger connections with Iowa than Western has with
California. All its property, save a bank account or two was in Iowa,
all its books and records and nearly all the officers were in Iowa:
"It was conceived in Iowa, born in Delaware, and has lived its entire
life in Iowa.'" This is not the case with Western Air Lines, which
has only about three quarters of its property in California and a
little more than thirty per cent of its shareholders resident in the
state. Nevertheless, under the due process and full faith and credit
clauses, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,'" it is submitted that
a state may constitutionally regulate a foreign corporation although
it is not strictly a "pseudo-foreign" corporation under the old "in-
ternal affairs" rule. Thus, Mr. Latty in his article on "pseudo-foreign"
corporations"' would treat a corporation as "pseudo-foreign" if its
main business activity takes place in the domestic state, and if
there is a "predominance of the local interests among those to be
protected." He illustrates this by saying that, ". . . if most of the
shareholders (or maybe even most of the minority shareholders
outside the management group) are local residents, the ,
 local require-
ment for cumulative voting might be applied at the request of local
shareholders."'
Even if a "weighing of interests" test were applied there appears
168 231 Iowa at 827-28, 2 N.W.2d at 395.
168 231 Iowa at 807, 2 N.W.2d at 386.
170 See pp. 386-89 supra.
171 Latty, supra note 164, at 161-63.
172 Id. at 161.
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to be no compelling reason to disregard California's interest in this
instance, which instance is succinctly stated by the District Court:
To hold otherwise, and to follow the argument of West-
ern to its conclusion, would be to say that the commissioner
might have the power in the first instance to require certain
rights to be guaranteed to shareholders before he would
permit the sale or issuance of a foreign corporation's stock
in this State, but that immediately thereafter, by the device
of amending the charter of such corporation in another state,
the entire structure of that corporation, even to substantial
changes in the rights of shareholders in California, might
be legally effected. Such a holding would enable a foreign
corporation to destroy the rights which the State of Cali-
fornia has deemed worthy of protection by the enactment of
the Corporate Securities Act.'
4. Problems. The real problem facing the practitioner is in pre-
dicting how far the California commissioner of corporations will
be able to go in extending the rule in Western Air Lines. What if the
corporation does only twenty-five per cent of its business in Cali-
fornia? What if it owns no property or has no bank accounts in
California? What if only ten per cent or five per cent of the share-
holders are California residents? What if there is no proxy solicita-
tion or there are no meetings in California? Suppose the corporation
wants to change its name; or does not want to amend its charter at
all but merely wants to amend its by-laws to allow one director
to constitute a quorum to fill vacancies on the board? Are these
"changes in the rights, preferences and privileges" on the corporation
stock? Is the statute unconstitutional if applied in any of these cir-
cumstances?
These are but a few of the problems which will arise under the
rule in the Western Air Lines case. Take, for instance, the case of
Western States Petroleum Co. 174
 Corporation A is a Delaware cor-
poration, with no property in California, and not qualified as a foreign
corporation in California. Its principal and only place of business
is Delaware. A has issued and outstanding 1,000 shares of stock, all
owned by corporation B, also a Delaware corporation. None of the
directors of A are residents of California. The incorporators met
in Delaware to form A and all its directors' meetings have been
173 Western Air Lines v. Sobieski, Comm'r, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
174 File No. LA-I65414, Calif. Div. of Corps., Dec. 8, 1951. See Cowett, Re-
organizations, Consolidations, Mergers and Related Corporate Events Under the Blue
Sky Laws, 13 Bus. Law. 418, 760 (1958).
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held in New York or Nevada. A made four agreements with four
other corporations: (a) an agreement with corporation B by which
B would exchange all of its assets for stock of A, and A would
assume all the indebtedness of B; (b) a similar agreement with cor-
poration C, a Delaware corporation, and a holding company which
holds a controlling interest in corporation E. Its office is in Delaware;
(c) a similar agreement with corporation D, a California corporation
engaged in the production of crude oil and natural gas. The share-
holders and properties of D are principally in California; (d) an
agreement of merger by which corporation E will merge into A. E
is a Delaware corporation with interests in two hundred and seventy-
two oil wells and gas wells in over seven states, including California,
and owning 71,837 undeveloped acres of land in ten states including
California.'" It seems that twenty per cent of the voting power of
corporation E is owned by California residents. E's principal office
is in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and at least three directors are California
residents, although the meetings were being held in Nevada at the
time of the merger agreements.
None of the meetings arranging the above agreements, and
none of the board of directors meetings were held in California, nor
were the agreements executed in California. There was no proxy
solicitation in California. The shareholders' meetings called to approve
the merger agreement were held in Delaware, and necessary approval
was obtained there. If the steps of filing and recording the agreement
of merger are taken, then the state of Delaware, by force of its law,
converts the securities of each of the constituent corporations into
the securities of the surviving corporation. There will be no issuance
of the stock of the new company in California. The transfer of
stocks pursuant to the exchange agreements (a)-(c) will take place
outside California. If the entire plan is carried out, sixty-six per cent
of the new preferred stock of corporation A and twenty-seven per
cent of its new common stock will be in the hands of Californians.
The California commissioner claims that these transactions are
"exchanges" and "changes in the rights" within the meaning of
section 25509 and that before such transactions can be consummated
a permit must be obtained.'"
175 The extent of E's property is not entirely clear. The commissioner found that
E's property and shareholders were "principally" in California: File No. LA-165414,
Calif. Div. of Corps., Dec. 8, 1951. Corporation A, in its application for a permit from
the California commission claimed that E had no property in California: Application
of Western States Petroleum Co., Inc., Commissioner of Corporations of the State of
California, Nov. 4, 1959, pp. 5-6. The facts in the text are taken from Moody's
Industrial Manual 2082 (1959),
175 These facts were drawn from the following sources: Western States Petroleum
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Very little treatment is given to the jurisdictional question in
the commissioner's opinion. Unfortunately for the commentators
(but fortunately for Western States) the petition was granted; there-
fore, the courts will not have an opportunity to explore the constitu-
tional implications of this most complex factual situation.
The only way in which a "sale" could occur in California is
if the "change in the rights" effected by the mergers occurred in
California.'" As noted above, 1T" the question of the "situs" of a
"change in rights" is really a question of whether California as a mat-
ter of policy believes it should regulate the transaction to protect
its shareholders.'7° California believed it did have such an interest
in approving the entire scheme in view of the large number of
shareholders, resident in California, whose rights would be affected.
California has a very strong interest with respect to its own
corporation (D); thus, as regards the sale of assets involving that
corporation, there ought to be no constitutional difficulty. California
also has an interest in seeing that its residents, having or about to
have an interest in any of these foreign corporations, are not treated
unfairly by the plan (viz. that dividend arrearages on preferred stock
are not being eliminated unreasonably, that old common stockholders
are not unreasonably wiped out, or that they receive some participa-
tion in the new company, whether shareholders in the new company
may vote cumulatively). In view of these interests of the regulating
state, there seems to be no great need for regulation by one law
(i.e. et al. Delaware) in this case.
However, if a court were to sustain the constitutionality of this
instance of regulation, it would be extending the rule of the Western
Air Lines case to include regulation of transactions involving five
corporations, where although a substantial number of California
shareholders were involved, only two of the corporations actually
Co., Inc., File No. LA-165414, Calif. Div. of Corps., Dec. 8, 1959; Application of
Western States Petroleum Co., Inc., Commissioner of Corporations of the State of
California, Nov. 4, 1959; Moody's Industrials, section 1, at 1905 (1959); Moody's
Industrial Manual 1000-1001, 2081-2082 (1959); Letter From John G. Sobieski, Comm'r,
to the author, Jan. 4, 1960; Letters From F. Arnold Daum (director of one of the
constituent corporations) to the author, Feb. 1, 1960 and Feb. 9, 1960.
777 See note 120 supra. Since no physical act in furtherance of the proposed mergers
occurred in California (as in the case of Western Air Lines), there could be no
"exchange" of securities or no "attempt to change the rights on" the securities held by
Californians.
178 See note 126 supra.
778 The one thing that seems clear is that there must be a California resident share-
holder whose rights would be "changed" by the charter amendment or other corporate
act.
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did a substantial amount of business in California180 (one of these
being a domestic corporation), and no physical acts in furtherance
of the scheme took place in California. We have not yet heard
the last on the Western Air Lines case.
180
 There was a question as to the extent of corporation E's business in California.
See note 175 supra.
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